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ABSTRACT
Over the past fifteen years, much of Hong Kong's low-value-added manufacturing sector
has moved over the border into China to exploit lower labor and land costs there. Recently,
leading Hong Kong politicians and industrialists have identified software development as one
of the keys to reinvigorating Hong Kong's local industrial base. Software is particularly
attractive to Hong Kong because barriers to entry for individual firms are low, allowing small
firms to thrive, and because production of software does not require large amounts of land or
major public investments in infrastructure. However, a vibrant Hong Kong software industry
has not yet emerged.
Many leading Hong Kong politicians and industrialists point to the lack of technology-
focused venture capital funds in Hong Kong's capital markets and Hong Kong's small
domestic market size as the key variables that are inhibiting the growth of the software
industry. However, comparative research on software industry development in Ireland, Israel,
India, and the U.S., as well as Hong Kong, suggests that fundamental factors inhibiting the
growth of Hong Kong's software industry lie in the field of human resource development and
in the lack of "source" organizations. These results have important implications for Hong
Kong's industrial, political, and educational communities as they formulate priorities for the
development of a local software industry.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard K. Lester
Title: Professor of Nuclear Engineering
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1. INTRODUCTION
This thesis looks at the nascent software industry in Hong Kong and the factors that
could potentially be inhibiting its growth. The basis for my research was a broader research
project called Made By Hong Kong (MBHK). The project was done by MIT's Industrial
Performance Center (IPC) with the goal of understanding the future of industry in Hong
Kong. The MBHK study was a year long project sponsored by Hong Kong's Industry
Department and a group of private sponsors, and it involved 9 faculty members and 12
graduate students and research staff members at MIT. The research focused on 5 sectors of
Hong Kong industry: textiles and clothing, electronics, information technology,
biotechnology, and capital markets. Cross-cutting studies of Hong Kong's capital markets and
its education and training institutions were also carried out.
My role was as part of the team studying the information technology (IT) sector. As
its work progressed, the IT team began to see software as a potentially important, but still
underdeveloped segment of Hong Kong industry. Even as Hong Kong's traditional
manufacturing sector was relocating to China to take advantage of the lower land and labor
costs, a software industry could provide high wage jobs with relatively minimal use of land
space. The potential value of a software industry to Hong Kong was not only our view, but
also the view of many leaders in Hong Kong as well. According to KK Yeung, former
chairman of one of the government committees focused on information technology, "If we
[Hong Kong] are to explore what opportunities remain which promise high long term growth,
attractive profitability and little impact to the environment, it must be apparent that the
development of a local software industry could be most attractive"' The importance of high-
technology to Hong Kong's future growth is even being acknowledged at the highest levels of
government. In late 1997, in an unprecedented move which went against Hong Kong's long
history of not picking industry's to favor, C.H. Tung, the chief executive of the Hong Kong
SAR, announced a new government led industrial policy with the goal of building a role for
Hong Kong in East Asia's booming high-tech industries".
Other governments, including those of Taiwan, Singapore, India, Israel, and Ireland, to
name a few, have played a more active role in developing an indigenous high-tech sector.
While the pessimist might call Hong Kong a late-comer to this game, the optimist would say
that Hong Kong has many models from which to pick and choose.
My role as part of MBHK's information technology team was to understand the
current state of Hong Kong's software industry and the challenges to growth it faced. My
research entailed secondary research as well as almost 60 interviews in Hong Kong spread
among people in the software industry, academia, and the Hong Kong government. The
results of that research turned up a variety of challenges to the growth of the Hong Kong
software industry. However, what it did not do was provide a context for understanding the
relative importance of each of those challenges. The work done for this thesis builds on my
MBHK research by providing a framework with which to understand not only what the
challenges to the growth of the Hong Kong software industry are, but more importantly, what
the relative importance of the different challenges to the growth of the industry are.
The analysis of the barriers to growth of Hong Kong's software industry is
conducted via a framework consisting of 5 key variables. These variables and their definition
are shown in the table below.
Intellectual Iroperty
Protection
Domestic Market
Capital Markets
Human Resources
Source Organizations
Table
bottware piracy in tne aomestlc marKet
The size and sophistication of domestic demand for software.
Opportunities for the financing of young software firms via
equity placements and initial public offerings.
The quality of engineers going into the software industry.
Organizations which provide the technological or managerial
base of new enterprises.
1: Barriers to growth in the software industry
These five variables were selected because they neatly capture essentially all of the challenges
to the growth of the Hong Kong software industry that were uncovered during my research
with the MBHK project"' .
The goal of this thesis is to provide a context for understanding which of these issues
are relatively more important in their impact on the software industry's growth in Hong
Kong. This context is developed by looking at Hong Kong in reference to software industries
in four other economies-the US, India, Ireland, and Israel.
These particular countries were chosen for different reasons. While India, Ireland, and
Israel all have what many consider to be "successful" software industries, they are successful
for very different reasons. India has built its success on selling professional services and custom
software. Ireland's success is built mostly on MNCs, but also has an emerging indigenous
industry. Israel's software industry, much like silicon valley, is built on the growth of
indigenous firms with sophisticated technology products. By looking at software industries
with such very different reasons for success, we can better understand if there are any
fundamental variables that are key to the growth of a software industry in general. The
second reason for choosing those three countries is that, despite their success, they seem to be
relatively similar to Hong Kong along several dimensions. Namely, they all have small
domestic markets for software, problems with intellectual property protection, and relatively
nascent commercial high-tech industries. The US was chosen as a comparison economy
because of the rich amount of data on how various high-tech industries developed, the
challenges those industries faced, and how they overcame those challenges.
By taking the data from the MBHK study on Hong Kong's software industry and
placing it in the context of these four comparison economies across each of the 5 key variables,
the goal is to understand the role of these variables in the growth of Hong Kong's software
industry. The next five chapters consider each variable in turn as it pertains to Hong Kong
and the comparison economies. The conclusion to this thesis draws together the conclusions
of the previous five chapters. The results have important implications for industrialists and
policy makers in Hong Kong who are concerned with the development of a vibrant domestic
software industry.
APPENDIX A
SOFTWARE INDUSTRY INTERVIEWS
person A is a senior official in Hong Kong's Customs & Excise Department, Intellectual
Property Investigation Branch.
person B is a senior official in Hong Kong's Intellectual Property Department.
person C is a senior member of the Software Industry Information Center
person D is the managing director of a successful Hong Kong software firm which serves the
textile industry
person E is a software consultant with a Hong Kong software firm.
person F is the founder of a Hong Kong software firm.
person G is a manager in the information technology department of a Hong Kong bank.
person H is the founder of a Hong Kong software company specializing in the graphics.
person I has served on information technology policy making bodies of the Hong Kong
government and is the managing director of a Hong Kong non-government organization.
person J is the founder and managing director of a Hong Kong software firm focusing on the
retail industry.
person K is the president and CEO of a Hong Kong software firm producing software for the
retail industry and a member of one of Hong Kong's IT policy making committees.
person L is the president and CEO of a Hong Kong software firm focusing on the financial
service industry. His firm not only serves the Hong Kong community, but it also exports
software throughout Asia.
person M is the managing director of a relatively large Hong Kong software firm which serves
the manufacturing industry. This firm has received various awards for producing exceptional
software.
person N is the general manager of a Hong Kong software firm which develops software for
the construction and architectural design industry.
person O is the managing director of a relatively large Hong Kong software company serving
the financial service community. Person 0 also serves in a variety of positions in Hong Kong's
IT trade associations.
person P is the managing director of young Hong Kong software firm still in the product
development stage.
person Q is the founder and president of a Hong Kong software firm making sophisticated
financial analysis software.
person R is a member of a non-profit organization serving the indigenous Hong Kong
software industry.
person S is a senior member of Hong Kong's civil service who is involved in executing
government policy with respect to the information technology industry.
EDUCATION SECTOR INTERVIEWS
person 1 was a professor of computer science for two years at Hong Kong University and is
now a lecturer in computer science at MIT.
person 2 is a professor in the computing department at Polytechnic University
person 3 is a senior faculty member of Polytechnic University's computing department
person 4 is a senior faculty member of Hong Kong University's computer science department
person 5 is a faculty member of Hong Kong University's computer science department.
person 6 is a faculty member of Chinese University's computer science department.
person 7 is a university chancellor
person 8 is a senior employee at Polytechnic University's industrial training center.
person 9 is a senior faculty member in the department of electrical engineering at the Hong
Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST)
person 10 is a career office counselor at HKUST
person 11is a career counselor at Polytechnic University
person 12 is a IT engineering career officer with City University
person 13 is a professor at the University of Hong Kong and a senior officer with their
industrial training program
person 14 is a senior career officer with Baptist University
2. INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PROTECTION
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Given the intangible nature of software and the ease with which it can be copied,
adequate intellectual property protection (IPP) plays an important role in allowing software
developers to reap the financial returns of their creative work. However, given the ease with
which many types of software can be copied and the difficulty of detecting when copies are
made, piracy has had a large impact on the software industry overall. According to the 1995
results of the first global survey on software piracy in 1995, an estimated $13.1 billion dollars
were lost world-wide due to piracyiv. Piracy percentage rates ranged from the high twenties in
the US and Canada to the high eighties and even high nineties in Eastern Europe and some
parts of Asia. The extent of the problem can be seen when countries which have piracy rates
in the high thirties and low forties, like Germany (42%), UK (38%), and Australia (35%), are
considered to have "low" rates of piracyv.
In Hong Kong specifically, the rate of piracy is of concern to many. For the first time
ever, in 1997, Hong Kong was moved onto the US Trade Representative's (USTR's) "Watch
List" in the USTR's annual Special 301 Reviewvi'. This review details the US view of foreign
shortcomings in IPP and rates countries as "priority foreign country," "priority watch list," or
"watch list" according to the level of piracy ("priority foreign country" represents the most
egregious level of piracy). The 1997 Special 301 Review found that piracy actually got
worse in Hong Kong over the preceding year despite government efforts to combat the
problem. The USTR is not alone in its concern over the level of piracy in Hong Kong. The
Washington based International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) recommended that, in
December 1996, the USTR move Hong Kong to the "priority watch list."''v Further more, a
1994-95 study on the Hong Kong software industry, conducted by the international market
research firm Dataquest, commented that piracy is "the most important market factor that
must be addressed for Hong Kong to realize success in the packaged software market." One of
this study's three main recommendations was that "the government should step up
enforcement of IPP laws, especially against those creating and selling illegal copies of consumer
software.viii""
While piracy seems to be significant in Hong Kong as well as on a world-wide basis,
the goal of this section is understand how large an impact Hong Kong's domestic IPP situation
has had on the growth of its indigenous software industry. This issue will be examined in
three main parts. First, I will consider why people pirate software and what kind of software
people pirate in general. Second, I will look at the extent to which piracy exists in Hong
Kong, paying particular attention to which segments of the software industry in Hong Kong
are affected the most. Third, I will try to understand some of the causes of piracy in Hong
Kong and how effective the government has been in dealing with those causes. Finally, I will
examine what this evidence suggests regarding whether or not IPP is a key barrier inhibiting
the growth of the software industry.
2.2 WHY DO PEOPLE PIRATE SOFTWARE AND WHAT TYPES OF SOFTWARE
DO THEY PIRATE?
The research on why people pirate software and the types of software they pirate is
rather limited, but what exists provides some interesting insights into what part of the software
industry may be most vulnerable to piracy. Cheng (1997) conducted a study to identify
people's reasons for purchasing versus pirating a given piece of softwareix. Interestingly,
according to Cheng, people don't decide to purchase software because it is the law or because
of company or school policy. The main reason why someone will purchase a piece of
software is because it is required for their work and because it is something that they believe
they will use very frequently. Cheng also looks at the reasons for pirating software. It is
widely believed that people pirate software is because it is easy to do so. However, the main
reasons Cheng's research participants cited for pirating software was because the software is
either too expensive and/or they want to try the software out. The fact that software is easy
to copy and that there is little chance of being caught are ranked as relatively unimportant
reasons. The table below summerizes Cheng's findings.
#1 reason: Required for school or work
#2: Use the software all the time
#3: Availability of a manual
#4: It's the law
#6: It's school/company policy
#8: No viruses on original software
#1 reason: Software is too expensive
#2: Want to try out the software
#3: Can't afford the software
#4: Only use it for a short period of time
#5: Easy to copy
#7: Little chance of being caught
Table 2: Reasons to purchase versus pirate softwarex
An interesting conclusion from Cheng's research is that computer games make a prime
target for piracy. Computer games don't meet the top reasons to purchase (i.e. "required for
work or school" and "use all the time"), and they do meet a top reason to pirate (i.e. "want to
try out the software"). This is because it is often hard to know how entertaining a game will
be before it is purchased and, even if it is entertaining initially, the intensity of computer game
usage is typically short compared to productivity software. Cheng also notes that the strong
perception that software is overpriced could be further enhanced by the low cost of pirating
software. Finally, Cheng's data shows that people are not concerned with breaking the law or
company policy when it comes to copying software. Many studies have similarly showed that
there are very low moral costs associated with software piracy. A study by Logsdon,
Thompson, and Reid further confirmed that software piracy is perceived as an issue of low
moral intensity, and suggests that the software industry should focus on moral intensity at the
individual level instead of focusing exclusively on institutional compliance.x Solomon (1991)
showed that business students view piracy as socially and morally acceptable"x. Even more
relevant to Hong Kong, Swinyard (1990) found that Asians have a more casual attitude toward
piracy than Americans because of Asian attitudes which are rooted in cultural mores that
emphasize sharing creative workxii.
In light of these findings, how industry can best control piracy? One method
suggested by the data above is that piracy would be better controlled if people associate a
stronger moral cost with pirating. Gopal (1997) tries to understand the impact on deterrence
activities (such as increasing the moral cost of pirating) versus preventative measures (i.e.
measures which prevent people from buying pirated software or which prevent them from
copying original software themselves)"'. As long as individuals perceive certainty and severity
of punishment, deterrence theory suggests that individuals will be inhibited from doing illegal
acts. Gopal's results show that, while both deterrence and prevention decrease piracy,
deterrence methods have a positive impact on software producer profits while preventative
measures have a negative impact. Beyond the results shown by Gopal's quantitative model,
anecdotal evidence is presented to further support his claim. Around 1985, a number of US
software companies started removing copy protection devices from their software and began
active educational and legislative campaigns. Furthermore, the effectiveness of deterrence,
especially when focused on raising the "moral cost" of an action, has been cited in several
studies. Schwartz found, for example, that appeals to the conscience were more effective in
getting people to comply with tax laws than legal sanctionsxiv. Paternoster studied juvenile
delinquents and found that moral considerations significantly impacted their criminal
behavior".
2.3 EXTENT OF PIRACY IN HONG KONG
While the level of piracy in HK is not as high as in many other locations, it has
recently been increasing instead of decreasing. The increase from 1996 to 1997 is what
prompted the USTR to put Hong Kong on its "watch list" for the first time in Hong Kong's
history. The average piracy rate in Hong Kong in 1995 was 62%, which resulted in software
losses of US$123 million. The piracy rate was actually unchanged from 1994, but 62% in 1994
only equated to $64 millionv. Much of the pirated software in Hong Kong seems to be
productivity and entertainment packaged software for the PC. Recently, pirated software has
been selling on CD ROMs which are traditionally produced in China and shipped to Hong
Kong. CD ROMs allow pirates to offer a much greater amount of software on each disk than
is possible with high-density floppy disks. The information on 400-500 high-density floppy
disks could fit onto one CD ROM. This allows the pirates to produce "compilation" CD
ROMs which have dozens of software titles from multiple vendors. These CD ROMs might
contain $10,000 worth of software and sell for about $10.
CD ROM pirates are surprisingly effective at delivering the most recent software titles
to the Hong Kong market. In 1995, many were shocked when pirated versions of Windows
'95 were on sale only weeks after its official launch. However, pirates have become much
more sophisticated and have cut down the delay between the official launch of a product and
the "launch" of the pirated version. Electronic Arts released Fifa '97 (a soccer video game) and,
within three days of its US launch, a pirated version was on sale in Hong Kong. A pirated
version of Microsoft's Encarta '97 (an electronic encyclopaedia) was actually available for sale
in Hong Kong before its official release"
In Hong Kong, the greatest rate of software piracy occurs in the video games segment.
It is estimated that more than 90% of video game software sold in Hong Kong is illegally
copied. To get a sense of the retail distribution capabilities of the pirates, one raid involved
43 retailers at 7 separate shopping arcades throughout Hong Kong"ii. The retail sellers of
pirated software have public store fronts and keep regular business hours. The reach of the
pirates in Hong Kong is hard to fathom. One game developer handed out evaluation copies of
a new game to only five of his most trusted distributors but, within a few days, a pirated
version of the game still turned up in the Hong Kong shopping arcadesxvi'. The total losses for
the video game sector were estimated to be at $90 million for 1996 alonexv'. This evidence is
consistent with the research presented in Section 2, which suggested that video games are an
especially vulnerable segment given that the intensity of their use is typically very short, and
that it is typically the type of software that people like to "try out."
Consumer software like video games is not the only segment to see pressure from
pirates. Pirated packaged software for corporate customers is also widely available in Hong
Kong. For instance, the latest versions of Autodesk's AutoCAD Release 13 (retail price
US$4,250), Novell's NetWare 4.1 (retail price $2,845) and Lotus's Smartsuite were packaged
with over 100 other programs owned by different companies and sold openly in Hong Kong
in October 1995 for Hong Kong$50 (US$6.50). Hong Kong corporations seem to be taking
advantage of this type of software. In February 1997, Roman Financial Press, Hong Kong's
biggest publishing group, paid the Business Software Alliance (BSA), a whistle blowing agency,
about $50,000 for using unauthorised Microsoft and Adobe software. Furthermore, the BSA
has received tip-offs from employees in Hong Kong that have allowed it to put over 60
companies under investigation.xvi
What the data above suggests is that piracy in Hong Kong is particularly concentrated
in the segment of packaged software for the mass market. In terms of productivity software,
piracy has its greatest impact on US firms, while the extensive piracy in the video game
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segment effects Japanese, US, and Taiwanese firms. Given the high level of piracy in Hong
Kong, the next question we ask is why is it so seemingly unchecked?
2.4 CONTROL OF SOFTWARE PIRACY IN HONG KONG
Two key influences on the rate of software piracy are the IPP laws and the degree to
which those laws are enforced. According to Kiichi Nishikura, general counsel for Sega, one
of the largest video games manufacturers in the world, Hong Kong has some of the toughest IP
laws in the region xvii . Hong Kong's copyright ordinances have become even more stringent in
recent years. The following excerpt from the ordinances shows the current fines and the fines
in nlace only a few years earlier in Darenthesis:
Given that the laws seem to provide at least reasonable protection, what can be said of
the enforcement of these laws? The department responsible for enforcing the copyright laws is
the Intellectual Property Investigation Bureau (IPIB) of the Customs and Excise Department.
This type of specialized enforcement task-force for tackling copyright and trademark
violations is unique among Asian economies. Over the three year period from 1995-1997, the
IPIB increased its manpower by 40%, one of the fastest growing branches of the Hong Kong
civil service". The increase in effectiveness of this department from 1994-1996 is shown in the
table below.
"Anybody possessing infringing copy for business or trade is liable for HK$25000
(HK$1000) per copy and imprisonment for two (one) years. Max penalty for
possessing equipment for making infringing copies is fine of HK$250,000
(HK$50,000) and imprisonment for four (two) years. '
- -. . . . . . . .----.. . .-- ----------------  -
:
1,566
Arrests
CD-ROMs seized
1,112
5,406
1,447
256,138
1,061
258,487
Table 3: Enforcement of software IP by the HKIPIBxxi
Consistent with the data on the video game sector mentioned previously, confiscation data
shows that 50% of the pirated CD-ROMs were video games.
How then can the tough laws and seemingly competent enforcement be reconciled
with the fact that Hong Kong was moved on to the USTR's Special 301 watch list? Many in
Hong Kong's government say this is because the actual CD's are made in China and that Hong
Kong enforcement has no jurisdiction there. When, in December 1994, Dataquest
recommended to the Hong Kong government that it should step up the enforcement of IPP
laws, the government disagreed. According to the IT committee of the Hong Kong ITTTDC
In late 1996, when government officials were asked why it was so difficult to control piracy in
Hong Kong, they responded that it is "a question of resources, working to the letter of the
law, and the fact that the actual CDs are not made in Hong Kong but in China." According to
officials, in the 1970's there was a huge problem with counterfeit music tapes, but that was
eliminated because the manufacturing plants were in Hong Kong.xvi Person A, a senior officer
at the IPIB, agrees that fighting piracy in Hong Kong means shutting down CD ROM
manufacturing plants in China. According to person A, "the problem must be tackled at the
"The Committee considers that legal protection oflP in Hong Kong is adequate and
notes that penalties for piracy have recently been substantially increased and
enforcement actions have also been stepped up.. .on the other hand, the Committee
observes that piracy in China is also rampant and Hong Kong can do little in this
respect. . .The Committee therefore recommends that the government should relay
this message to the Chinese authority through the appropriate channels. ' -i
Cases 1,380 1,061
- -V--~ -LVIL~ -L ~ Y U
source. Until we can do something about the source, we won't be able to tackle the
problem. So, we're cooperating with China" .However, despite the conviction by many that
China is the main problem for piracy in Hong Kong, more recent data says otherwise. In a
December 1997 news article, data shows that pressure on counterfeiters in China has caused
them to move across the boarder into Hong Kong and Macao. Two years ago, there were no
counterfeit software production lines in Macao and only 7 in Hong Kong. As of December
1997, there were 100 in Macao and 40 in Hong Kong. During that same period of time when
production of counterfeit CD ROMs moved into Hong Kong, Hong Kong's piracy rate got
worse. Apparently, because Beijing banned imports of machines that make CDs, much of the
equipment was stranded in Hong Kong and Macao so the counterfeiters decided to build their
base there.
To better understand the challenges of dealing with piracy in Hong Kong, consider the
two basic ingredients identified in Section 2-prevention and deterrence. In terms of
prevention, it is clear that while the IPIB is aggressively growing to deal with software piracy,
it is still overwhelmed. Even though the IPIB increased its manpower by 60% between 1996
and 1997, the piracy rate in Hong Kong also rose"'. Person A of IPIB puts the difficulty of
preventing piracy in Hong Kong into perspective. Before working as part of the IPIB, says
person A, he "worked to stop the drug trafficking going on between Hong Kong and China.
Once [he] was successful there, the government decided to give him a tougher assignment-
trying to stop piracy in HK." The extent of piracy in Hong Kong beyond just software lends
support to person A's statement. Despite the significant seizures of CD ROMs in 1995, these
only represented 43% of the total CDs and LDs (Laser Discs) confiscated in 1995. The
remainder consisted of counterfeit music and movies. In addition to technology products, the
IPIB also has to deal with counterfeit perfumes and clothing. Deterrence will be effective as
long as individuals perceive certainty and severity of punishment. In terms of piracy, we can
look at the issue of deterrence on the supply side and on the demand side. On the supply
side, the challenge in Hong Kong is that, while the laws are tough, there is no perception of
certainty or severity of punishment. For example, while the maximum fine is US$3,205 per
item, the average fine handed down was US$5.13 per item in 1996xx. This fine per item is less
than the street price of the counterfeited CD ROM, which typically sells for US$8 to $10, and
far less than the retail price of the software that may be on the CD ROM. Furthermore, while
the maximum jail time can range between two and four years, the average sentence handed
down is two months. This is compared with counterfeiter sentences in China which average 7
yearsxviii. For counterfeiters in Hong Kong, while the laws might be tough, the actual
punishments handed down are more of a cost of doing business than a deterrence. On the
demand side, there simply is no law in Hong Kong that prevents an individual from using
pirated software. Furthermore, software companies see it as bad public relations to go after
individual users.
The other aspect of deterrence is to raise the moral cost of "antisocial" actions-like
pirating software. Having myself lived in Hong Kong for four months, I was able to observe a
significant number of government-sponsored commercials that talked about how it was wrong
to pollute, play on escalators, and throw trash out of windows, as well as several other
activities. The government seemed keen on using these TV ads to raise the moral costs of a
number of behaviors it considered "antisocial." However, not once did I see a government
sponsored commercial on the damaging effects of consumer purchases of pirated software on
the growth of the local software industry or the growth of the economy as a whole. The best
explanation for why there was no TV campaign came best from person B, a senior official in
the Hong Kong Intellectual Property Department, the department responsible for writing
Hong Kong's IPP laws. According to person B:
"I tried to start a campaign earlier, but the government refused to give me the
money. The problem comes with trying to get money for new staff The
government will pay for the cost of capital items, but they won't pay for labor.
They'll buy me air time on the TVstation, but they won't pay for me to get staff to
produce the commercials. That's why you see all these terribly produced public
service ads on TV They want me to use the staffI already have to do the anti-piracy
campaign, but my staff have to focus their attention on rewriting the IP laws before
the handover."
At the time of the interview with person B in late 1996, he was planning a campaign to
generate better awareness, where the "goal of the campaign would be to get businesses to use
legitimate software." However, it was not clear whether or not this would target the broader
Hong Kong population.
Thus, from a prevention and deterrence perspective, we can see why Hong Kong is
having difficulty combating piracy. The IPIB is being overwhelmed and there is very little to
deter pirates or individuals from dealing in pirated software. This is not to say that Hong
Kong is not devoting significant resources to combating the problem. The IPIB has been
expanding its manpower significantly each year, and the Hong Kong Intellectual Property
Department was spending a great deal of time rewriting Hong Kong's IPP laws before the
handover. But the question of whether or not Hong Kong will be able to take control and
significantly reduce software piracy in the near future remains unresolved.
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2.5 CONCLUSION
In Hong Kong, controlling piracy in many areas, not just software, is a significant
challenge for the current government. The IPIB cannot grow fast enough to keep up with the
demand for its services, and the punishments handed down by the Hong Kong courts seems to
have little deterrence effect. But the question remains: To what extent is the piracy and the
government's inability to control it affecting the growth of the indigenous software industry?
The preceding evidence suggests that the piracy in Hong Kong is not in fact a key
barrier to the growth of the industry. First, as we saw from the confiscation data, 50% of
confiscated CD ROMS are video games. Thus a significant percentage of the software piracy is
concentrated in one very narrowly focused segment of software-video games. A majority of
the remaining 50% of pirated software seems to be productivity-type software packages
produced for relatively horizontal markets. This makes sense because this type of software is
the easiest to sell via retail-the preferred method of distribution for pirates in Hong Kong.
The market for this type of productivity software tends to be dominated by companies in the
US. Even if the piracy rate in Hong Kong were zero, the odds of a Hong Kong firm being
able to compete in these horizontal packaged software markets with already established players
is probably not great. Second, when we look at our comparison economies-India, Ireland,
and Israel, they all have rapidly growing software industries despite high levels of domestic
piracy. For example, India had a piracy rate of 78% in 1995, 16% greater than Hong Kong. In
February 1998 the Software Publishers Association (SPA) asked the US Trade Representative
(USTR) to specifically identify 24 countries as the world's worst software piracy havens in its
annual review of unfair trade practices. In that report, Israel, Ireland and India were all
identified, along with Hong Kong, as among the world's worst havens for software piracy xx .
Thus, while piracy in Hong Kong is significant, there is no evidence to suggest that this piracy
is impacts the vertical markets where young Hong Kong software firms can be globally
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competitive, or that other indigenous software industries have failed to develop because of
high levels of domestic piracy.
3. ROLE OF DOMESTIC
DEMAND
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter seeks to understand the importance of domestic demand, both in terms of
size and sophistication, for the growth of Hong Kong's software industry. For many in Hong
Kong, including leaders in the local software industry, professional trade organizations, and
even outside consultants to the government, the small domestic market for software products
and services is a major problem. They argue that Hong Kong's domestic market, with 6
million people and $200 million in demand for software products and services is not large
enough to support the development of an indigenous software industry'. Leading academic
researchers concur that a strong domestic market helps to build internationally competitive
firms, while those firms developing in a weak domestic market have little chance of surviving
international competition. However, when Hong Kong's situation is compared with other
successful software economies like India, Ireland, and Israel, the case is less clear. These three
economies all have very little domestic demand for software, yet all have successful software
industries.
1 Hong Kong's domestic market size for software was estimated in the 1994-95 Consultancy Study on the Software
Industry.
By reconciling the theory on the importance of domestic market size with what we
see in practice, we can gain insight into the degree to which Hong Kong's domestic market is
affecting the growth of the indigenous software industry. This chapter is divided into five main
sections. Section 2 starts with an overview of the theory regarding how the domestic market
effects the international competitiveness of indigenous firms. Section 3 then focuses on
describing Hong Kong's domestic market for software products and services in order to
understand where potential competitive advantages and challenges may lie. Section 4 examines
the software industries of India, Ireland, and Israel in order to understand how their domestic
markets have impacted the growth of their software industries. The conclusions of this
analyses are presented in Section 5.
3.2 OVERVIEW OF THEORY
Various authors focus on different aspects of how domestic demand drives a given
domestic industry and the competitiveness of that industry in the international market.
Motta et al (1997) investigates whether a country supplying low quality products can catch up
with a rival country supplying high-quality products when both have access to the same
technologyX'. They find that, when countries open their economies to trade, firms' products
start from an initial level of quality which depends on local characteristics of demand. The
larger and more sophisticated the domestic demand, the higher the quality of the product
produced at the time trade begins. Thus, when firms coming from a larger and more
sophisticated domestic market begin to trade with those coming from a smaller and less
sophisticated domestic market, those firms coming from the larger more sophisticated market
will have the advantage. Using a simplified analytical framework, Paul Krugman also finds
that, when two countries trade, the one with the larger domestic market for a given product
will be the one who exports this product'. Michael Porter gives a more fine grained analysis
of the role played by domestic demandxxvi. According to Porter, there are three components to
demand which are significant in creating a national competitive advantage. The first is the
segment structure of demand. While the absolute size of a market can help the
competitiveness of firms, what is more important is the size of a particular segment relative to
other segments in that nation. This is because the segments in a nation which are relatively
larger will receive earlier and more attention by the nation's firms. The implication is that, in
segments which are relatively important to a small nation, that small nation can be globally
competitive even if the absolute size of that segment is smaller than similar segments in
competing nations. The second important aspect of domestic demand, according to Porter, is
having sophisticated and demanding buyers. These types of consumers put constant pressure
on a firm to produce ever better products. The fact that these sophisticated consumer are close
physically and culturally to the firm means that it is easier for the firm to uncover new
needs. The final component of domestic demand that is significant is if the domestic market is
"anticipatory" of buyer needs elsewhere in the world. If customers in the domestic market
have needs that anticipate those of other nations, then this will give the indigenous firm an
advantage in producing the global product before their competitors do. What is important to
note in Porter's analysis is that domestic market size alone is not a source of competitive
advantage for firms. According to Porter, "provided that its composition is sophisticated and
anticipates international and not just domestic needs, the size and pattern of growth of home
demand can reinforce national advantage in an industry." These more subtle aspects of
domestic demand will be important in helping us understand how the home market of Hong
Kong and our comparison economies are impacting their respective software industries.
3.3 THE HONG KONG DOMESTIC MARKET FOR SOFTWARE PRODUCTS AND
SERVICES
Hong Kong's domestic market for software products and services in 1993 was roughly
US$200 million. This is almost evenly split between products and services. However, almost
70% of software products purchased in Hong Kong were imported. While Hong Kong has a
small market in terms of absolute size, among other Asia Pacific countries, IT spending per
capita is second only to Japan. Hong Kong also has some of the highest growth rates for
software and software services among the "developed" countries in the region. Hong Kong's
vanguard industries: financial services, telecommunications and utilities, and retail & wholesale
tend to spend more on IT than Hong Kong's other industries. For example, businesses in the
telecommunications and utilities sector had some of the highest concentrations of PCs in
Hong Kong. Almost 80% of companies in that sector had 50 or more PCsxxvi.
One of Hong Kong's strongest markets in terms of size is manufacturing. Hong
Kong is #2 in the world in clothing (behind Italy), #1 in the world in knitwear, #3 in toys
(behind Korea and Taiwan), and #2 in watches (behind Switzerland)xxviii. However, Hong
Kong's manufacturing sector as a whole was ranked 7th among 14 sectors in Hong Kong in
terms the number of PCs owned by businessesxxvi . However, the relatively weak presence of
computers in the overall manufacturing sector is consistent with the strategy of the
manufacturing sector to move to low cost China. As V-nee Yeh, a venture capitalist in Hong
Kong, described it, "sectors like manufacturing can afford to be behind in technology because
they can make up for it with lower costs."
In segments other than manufacturing that are important to the Hong Kong economy,
sophistication in using IT was also found to be weak. Small companies comprise a significant
percentage of Hong Kong businesses. However, one study found that 62% of small businesses
in Hong Kong didn't even have a computer in 1994 xxvii. During our research, we also found
it odd that, while Hong Kong has the 3rd largest film production base in the world (behind the
US and India), we couldn't find any software firms that targeted that vertical market.
Compared with the rest of East Asia, Hong Kong's consumer computer market seems
to be fairly sophisticated. Approximately 15.4% of the population owns a PC. This is the
second highest in East Asia, just behind Singapore at 21.9% and just ahead of South Korea at
11.1%. In terms of the Internet, Hong Kong has the highest percentage of the population
among East Asian countries using it. Hong Kong's Internet access rate is currently 10.48% of
the population compared with Singapore at 8.82% and Taiwan at 4.62%xxix. In terms of
people, this would mean that Hong Kong has about 900,000 people who own a computer and
about 600,000 people who are connected to the Internet.
Mainland China is a potential extension of Hong Kong's domestic market, but
consumers there are only just beginning to purchase computers and connect to the Internet.
China has about .4% of the population using computers, and only .03% connected to the
Internet. This translates to about 5 million people who own computers and 400,000 people
who are connected to the Internet. While the Hong Kong and China consumer markets may
not seem particularly small, an important factor that has to be taken into account is the
amount of piracy in Hong Kong and China. According to the US Trade Representative's
Special 301 Report (the report which addresses "unfair trade practices"), piracy in Hong Kong
is over 60% and piracy in China is over 90%. While most of the piracy in China is focused on
packaged software for horizontal products, demand for IT by China's vertical markets is
extremely limited at this point in time2. While the issue of piracy is addressed in more detail in
2 Comments made by HK software companies already in China cite their biggest difficult in selling to the Chinese
market as the lack of an understanding of IT.
the section on intellectual property protection, one has to be careful evaluating domestic
market size given such high rates of piracy.
Porter has described how strong demand segments in the domestic market can create
advantages for firms selling in those segments. Our research found several examples of very
successful software companies in Hong Kong which seem to affirm the value of a strong
domestic market. One example is Prima Designs. Prima produces CAD/CAM packaged
software for the textiles industry. The company is number one in Hong Kong and in the top
3 in the global market. Mr. James Tam, Managing Director of Prima, describes the
importance of learning from sophisticated customers in the domestic market. According to
Mr Tam.
Not only did the sophistication and size of the Hong Kong textile market help them develop
a competitive product and generate substantial revenue, contacts in the Hong Kong market
helped Prima to expand internationally. According to Mr. Tam, Prima first expanded abroad
because they "knew a Finish designer in Hong Kong who introduced us to companies in
Finland."
TA Consultants, a company focusing on software application development tools for
the financial service industry is another example of how a vanguard domestic industry in
Hong Kong helped to create an internationally competitive software firm. Mr. Mowling
Tung, CEO of TA Consultants, describes how the strong domestic market shaped his
company's success:
"our first client was like a partner. We were almost like an in-house developer.
.They were a textile manufacturer who told us what needed to be improved with
current CAD/CAM textile software. So he told us what needed to be done, and in
exchange we gave him a free system. This partner then introduced us to other
companies in the textile industry in Hong Kong."
- ------------------------------ -
"We started in Hong Kong in 1976 producing software for 32 different
From Mr. Tung's story, it is clear that the sophistication, and not just size, of the domestic
market was an important factor in allowing his firm to expand internationally.
However, despite the progress made by Hong Kong software companies serving Hong
Kong's vanguard industries, many in Hong Kong are concerned that the small domestic
market size and lack of sophistication in many other sectors will hold back the overall growth
of the software industry. The Hong Kong Computer Society (Hong KongCS), the most
influential IT professional association in Hong Kong, feels that the small domestic market in
Hong Kong is hurting the growth of the local software industry and wants the government to
take action. According to the Hong KongCS, "The local software market is lacking the
breadth and size needed to sustain and to grow its software industry. Unless this confining
factor is removed, it will be very difficult for the Hong Kong software industry to grow
healthily. "xxx In order to address this issue, the Hong KongCS observes that "it has been
proven in many nations that public expenditures can be used very effectively in fostering the
growth of a needed new industry.. .we believe this could begin [in Hong Kong] with the
preferential use, in Government, of IT products and services provided by local firms.""xxx' The
concept of getting the government to purchase more domestic software was brought up by
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industries. When we decided to focus on banking in 1983, Citicorp was our first
banking software client. Citicorp invests the most in technology of any bank. We
were part of Citicorp's Asia Technology Group. Citibank is one of the most
advanced and respected banks in terms of their use of technology. With their
reference, we went to other foreign banks in Hong Kong. By going to other
international banks in Hong Kong, we were able to spread to their branches located
elsewhere. For example, our expertise developed with Citibank led us to Chase
Manhattan and then Hong Kong Bank. We got our exposure with US and
European banks (located in Hong Kong) first, then we moved on to the Asian
banks. In Singapore, our software is in 3 out of the 4 major banks, and in China
we are in 4 out of the 5 banks. We've also developed for banks in Thailand,
Malaysia, and Indonesia. In Hong Kong, 15 different banks use our software.
Similarly, 15 banks in Taiwan use our software. Today, we have 56 clients
internationally, and we develop world wide solutions for over 60 countries."
others too. Mr. Fritz Chiu, Director of the Software Industry Information Center (SIIC),
noted that one of the major concerns conveyed to him by many Hong Kong software
companies is the question of how to get the government to buy more Hong Kong made
software3. According to Mr. Chiu:
As can be seen by the comments above, the concerns caused by Hong Kong's small domestic
market is prompting many to want the government to become a more important customer to
Hong Kong's domestic software industry.
3 The SIIC was set up because of the recommendations of "1994-95 Consultancy Study on the HK Software
Industry." It's goal is to assist local software companies acquire market information.
"Small software developers cannot get government tenders because those tenders are
usually given only to the big players. Local companies have the technical ability to
do the contracts but they lack the size required by the government. The government
needs to give some type of preference to local companies. Government contracts are
very important to give local companies experience so they can grow. Industry
doesn't want loans, they want experience. The way things are structured, the
government doesn't have projects for the small guys now, but industry hopes this
can change."
3.4 THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC DEMAND IN DRIVING THE SOFTWARE
ECONOMIES OF INDIA, ISRAEL, AND IRELAND.
3.4.1 OVERVIEW
In order to provide broader context for how the domestic market affects the growth of
a software industry, I looked at three other economies that have burgeoning software
industries but that also have relatively small domestic markets. By understanding the domestic
market of the different comparison economies and the type of software industries that are
developing, we can see both how universal the theories on the importance of the domestic
market are, as well as the extent to which the concerns of those in Hong Kong are valid.
3.4.2 INDIA
In 1996, India's domestic market for software products and services was US$470
million xxxii. With a population which is 150 times larger than Hong Kong, India's domestic
software market size was only twice as big. This is because India has one of the lowest
concentrations of IT in the world. There are only 7 computers for every 10,000 Indians
compared to the world average of 250 computers per 10,000. The concentration of telephones
is not much better with only 70 for every 10,000 Indians""'.
While the Indian domestic market for software is quite small, total sales of Indian
software and services are much larger and have been growing much faster than the domestic
market might suggest. The chart below summarizes the growth in exports of Indian software
from 1992 to 1996.
Indian Exported Software (1992-1996)
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Source: Data compiled from Correa, Carlos M., "Strategies for Software Exports from Developing Countries," World Development, Vol 24, No. 1,
pp171-182, 1996.
Figure 1: Growth in exports of Indian software
Thus, while the domestic market for software in India was about $470 million in 1996, the
total market for Indian software was nearly four times bigger at $1.6 billion. Furthermore, the
structure of the domestic market is significantly different than the structure of the export
market. In 1996, 75% of the exported software was in the form of professional services4 .
Only 10% of exports are products and packaged services. This is radically different from the
domestic market in which about 40% comes from products and packages and 45% comes from
turnkey solutions. Less than 10% of the domestic market is for professional services xx 'v.
Thus, it is clear that India's strength in exporting professional services came from something
other than experience derived from the domestic market.
Software developers in India are providing much more sophisticated consulting for
their export markets than would have ever been required for their domestic market. For
example, one successful Indian software exporter named Infosys Technologies has as its clients
Nordstrom, Xerox, Visa, GE, Reebok, and AT&T. Infosys dedicates a full time team of
4 Professional services typically involve developing customized software for a particular client. In this type of
arrangement, there is relatively little need for marketing and essentially no need to invest in R&D.
software professionals to each of its clients. In many cases, the team acts as a virtual
extension of the company's own in-house IT staff. The Tata Group, one of India's largest
conglomerates, entered the software business with the help of companies like Unisys. As far
back as 1990, Tata had 650 professionals experienced on Unisys, IBM, DEC, and HP hardware
environments who were exporting software to clients in 47 different countriesxxx
While domestic Indian software firms focusing on consultancy services have played an
extremely important part in helping the software industry to develop, foreign firms are now
starting to play an increasingly important role. Companies like Oracle, Motorola, GE, and
IBM have all opened development centers in India. These centers were not opened to make
software for the local market, but instead were opened to develop software specifically for
export. For example, Oracle's development site in India will develop a large part of the
operating system that will be going into its Network Computer. Motorola's site in India
develops software that helps it to simulate and test new microprocessors. With little
connection to the demand of the domestic market, sizeable foreign investments are being
placed in India's software industry.
Given India's domestic market and given the type of software being produced in India,
what can we say about how that domestic market affected the growth of the industry? The
table below compares Porter's model of domestic demand to India's situation.
Strong demand segment relative to other
sectors.
Sophisticated end user
Anticipatory buyer needs
Table 4: Is domestic demand
No. Indian software producers are developing
custom "mission critical" software for foreign
companies. There is no evidence that shows
that, relative to other sectors, that local
demand for mission critical business software
was significant.
No. The software being developed for export
needs to be much more sophisticated than
what local companies would use.
No. As a customer, the US and other foreign
countries represent lead users much more
than India's domestic market.
in India important?
What we see is that the types of software coming from India, both from the local firms
and from Indian sites of MNCs, have really not been driven in any way by local demand.
While there are a number of ways to explain this, what it does tell us is that the importance of
the domestic market might not be as great as people in Hong Kong may believe.
3.4.3 ISRAEL
Israel is a country that is only about 50 years old and has about 5 million people.
Despite this, its indigenous IT industry had 1997 sales of roughly $7 billion dollars. About $2
billion in sales goes to the domestic market while the rest gets exportedxxxv'. How did this
strength in technology develop? Link Magazine, The Middle East International Business
Magazine, gives a concise explanation:
Military Origins: Israeli expertise in microelectronics and software evolved
directly from the country's defense needs. The first impetus came after the
1967 Six Day War when France, which had been Israel's principal supplier of
sophisticated weaponry, joined an arms embargo against Israel.
The first need was to supply spare parts. For example, Blades Technology,
a company jointly owned by industrialist Stef Wertheimer with American's
United Technologies, was formed to make replacement fan blades for the jet
engines of Israel's French-made Mirage fighters. This led to the world market
for blades for military jet engines, and hence to civilian jets. At the same
time, Elbit, a name that is a Hebrew acronym for electronics and security,
was founded by Uzia Galil as the first non-state-owned electronics company
in Israel.
Imaging skills: The second major wave of military development came after
the 1973 Yom Kippur War when Israeli troops were surprised by the
capabilities of Egyptian troops using off-the-shelf night vision equipment that
the Israelis lacked.
Image processing, starting with thermal imaging, became a high priority, and
the Technion, Israel's premier technology university, started to churn out
graduates who went on to develop cheap and effective electronic defense
systems. In the late '70s this specialization in imaging led to the first two
civilian companies who made a name for themselves in the world. These
were Scitex in digitized pre-press systems and Elscint in computerized
tomography.
These were also the trailblazers in another trend that was to mark Israeli
technology companies. They went public on Wall Street, a radical move that
increased their capital base and turned management attention to first a US
then a global scale of operations.
The fighter that didn't: During the early 1980s there were only a handful of
companies in what could loosely be called civilian high-tech. Defense was still
a high priority and a good market with customers all over the world. The
cutting edge of skills were engaged in the attempt to build an all-Israeli
combat jet, the Lavi.
Economically, it was foolhardy for such a small country to try developing its
own combat aircraft, but the Lavi's avionics systems demanded skills in
software, imaging and communications on an unprecedented scale. A few
cynics claim that the best thing that ever happened to Israeli technology
industries was the cancellation of the Lavi program in the mid eighties
because thousands of professionals were fired, releasing large numbers
of talented engineers into the market with the clear notion that they could
build world class products.
A networked world: The rate of company formation increased drastically in
the late '80s with many firms specializing in imaging and communications
technologies.
At the same time US companies like Intel, Motorola, IBM and National
Semiconductor started to entrust their small Israeli R&D subsidiaries with
more critical parts of development work, leading to a higher level of expertise
and new skills in fields like semiconductor design, fabrication and equipment.
Another major boost with the invention of Local Area Networks (LANs)
when dozens of Israeli firms started making the routers and hubs that could
connect the LANs of the world. Companies like Lannet or Lanoptics, started
up, went public and thrived. They were usually well ahead of their field in
technology, few had enough marketing skills and none had enough clout to
confront the major American players in this industry once the LAN market
grew to its current size.
The skills developed in this market have been put to good use in the current
crop of interesting firms in the Internet technology field. Significantly, the
leader in this field, Lannet, merged last year with a major British competitor
because its principal stake holders realized that the company, though
successful, lacked the size needed to make an impact in this extremely
competitive market.
Israeli entrepreneurs used to avoid selling out their companies or technologies,
but have realized in recent years that this is often the best option for their
shareholders, themselves, and their workers. Other companies in smaller
niches like Aladdin, a world leader in software protection, went the other way
and recently bought FAST, a major German competitor to give it a keener
edge against Rainbow, an American competitor.
Russian Reinforcement: The industry received a major boost in the 90's
with the arrival of over 700 thousand new immigrants from the former Soviet
Union. Many of them were trained professionals with relatively little
knowledge of newer western technologies, but their superior training in basic
mathematics and physics enabled a large number to adapt very quickly to the
field.
Secure that data: While declining rapidly, the military still accounts for a
sizeable chunk of the local electronics industry, with about 20% of the sector's
total output. Army training and orientation has been particularly significant in
the technologies of data compression, data security and digital signals
processing. Much of the premium in this field is on algorithms that require
extensive mathematical flair.
Furthermore, the army is still a major supplier of expert personnel, ideas and
technologies to the civilian market. Many start-ups begin in Israel when a
group of young engineers with advanced knowledge in a specific field develop
an idea and then leave the army to continue work in civil life.
What can we learn from this historical perspective on the growth of the Israeli high
tech industry and the role of the domestic market? What the story above tells us is that well
trained people, heavy investment in technology, and the Israeli military all played a key role in
the development of the high tech industry. This might lead one to conclude that it was the
Israeli military that drove domestic demand for high tech products. Using Porter's model we
could be tempted to say that Israeli military met all three criteria of being an important
segment relatively in the economy, a sophisticated and demanding user, and, because of this
sophistication, anticipatory of buyer needs elsewhere. However, the story is more
complicated than this. The Israeli military meets Porter's criteria as a consumer of advanced
core-technology and not as a consumer of commercial technology products. For example,
developing advanced avionics for the Lavi would give companies (and the engineers in those
companies) experience with a core imaging or communications technology, but that in and of
itself does not tell a company how that core technology needs to be incorporated into a
commercial product, what features that commercial product needs to have, or what the needs
of the commercial customers are both in terms of the product and support. The fact that the
Israeli companies were so far ahead in terms of their core-technology made up for their initial
lack of understanding of what exactly the commercial market wanted. For Israel, the
military's contribution to the commercial success of Israeli technology firms was along an
important, yet narrow dimension-it spurred investments in R&D and in training of man
power. However, if we look at the domestic market for commercial Israeli high technology
products and services, beyond just the core technology, there seems to be little correlation
between the important components of domestic demand outlined by Porter and the global
competitiveness of Israel's technology firms today.
3.4.4 IRELAND
Of our 3 comparison economies, Ireland has the smallest population by far with
only three million people and a domestic software market worth IR$186 million in 1995.
However, despite this small domestic market, a recent survey put Ireland within the top five
global software exporters. Employment in indigenous software firms is at 5,773 people, and is
almost equal to the 6,011 people working in foreign owned companiesxxxii. However, as might
be expected, the average size of indigenous companies is much smaller than their multinational
counterparts. Irish software companies have an average of 15 people per company with only
24 companies having 50 or more people. This is as compared to the MNCs in the software
industry which have an average of 64 people per company. Total software revenue in 1995
was almost IR$3 billion, with about 87% of that coming from MNC software firms.
The success of the Irish software industry is clearly led by the multinational software
companies located there. Further, the success of the multinationals is clearly distinct from any
aspect of domestic demand. Multinationals in Ireland had revenues of IR$2.6 billion, a full
99% of that came from exported software. However, two questions that we might want to
answer are: 1) to what extent is the indigenous software sector growing and 2) to what extent is
the indigenous sector's success based on the domestic market.
While growth in the indigenous software sector in Ireland has not been as rapid as in
Israel or India, it still seems to be very healthy. The graphs below summarize the growth of
the indigenous software industry and compare it with the growth of the MNC software sector
in Irelandxxxviii.
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Figure 4: Revenue growth in the Irish software industry
What we see from the graphs above is that, even though the indigenous sector is significantly
smaller than the MNC sector, every growth measure for the indigenous industry is strong.
Given that there does seem to be healthy growth in the indigenous sector, the next question
address is the extent to which the domestic industry depends on the domestic market. The
_
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following charts paint a picture of the importance of the export market versus the domestic
market for the indigenous Irish software industryi"'.
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Figure 6: Overseas growth of indigenous sector
The charts above seem to show a moderately strong dependence by the indigenous software
industry on the domestic market. 42% of the indigenous sector's revenue came from the
domestic market, and 42% of firms get less than 20% of their revenue from exports.
However, there are still several issues to consider before passing judgment on the role of the
domestic market. First, in 1995 indigenous firms generated more money in absolute terms
from the domestic industry than MNCs. Indigenous firms generated IR$160 million while
MNCs generated only IR$26 million, almost 85% less than the indigenous industry. What this
seems to suggest is that the indigenous firms are not competing in the same market as the
MNCs. This is based on the logic that, if they were in the same market, the vastly greater
resources of the MNCs would give them larger absolute sales than the indigenous industry.
Since most of the MNC sector offers packaged software products, the fact that the indigenous
sector generates more in absolute terms than the MNC sector could mean that the indigenous
sector is offering custom software or packaged software targeted at more vertical markets.
The second issue is that, while the largest percentage of companies export none of their
product, the second largest percentage of companies export 90-99% of their product. 
In fact
31.5% of indigenous companies export less than 10% of their product, but 20% export 90% or
more. This tells us that there seems to be two main types of companies in Ireland, companies
which have a strong dependence on the domestic market and companies which have a strong
dependence on the export market. Unfortunately, what is not clear is the extent to which
companies who now heavily depend on the export market may have once depended on the
domestic market. What is also not clear is how many of the 20% of companies which are
exporting nothing are in the development stage of a product whose competitiveness will not be
related to the domestic market. Finally, regardless of the domestic market, the export market
has been extremely important to the growth of the Irish indigenous software industry. The
table below compares the growth in employment and revenues for the domestic market versus
the export market.
Domestic Employment
Overseas Employment
Domestic Revenue
Overseas Revenue
18.26%
n/a
35%
89%
28.43%
94.5%
33%
94.8%
Table 5: Growth in export versus domestic markets
The evidence for the role of the domestic market on Ireland's indigenous software
industry thus presents a mixed picture. However, what we do know is that 20% of firms get
90% or more of their revenue from exports and that the growth of the indigenous software
industry is being driven by the export market. Perhaps the best we can say about the effect of
domestic demand on the indigenous Irish software industry is that its effect may not be
important. Despite vagueness of that statement, it does have important implications. It
implies that, while having a strong domestic market can certainly help an industry, not having
one is not a key barrier to the industry's growth.
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3.5 CONCLUSION
The theory that a strong domestic market can help the international competitiveness
of an indigenous industry is well supported by scholars such as Michael Porter and Paul
Krugman. Here, however, we are addressing a different questions: is not having a strong
domestic market a key barrier to the growth of an indigenous software industry. The cases of
Ireland, Israel, and India suggest that the answer to this is no.
4. CAPITAL MARKETS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
According to a recent consultancy study by International Data Corporation (IDC), "the
primary constraint to software innovation in Hong Kong is the result of three inter-related
factors that start with the ISV's [independent software vendor's] acute lack of capital.""xxxix A
follow-up study on the Hong Kong software industry by Dataquest, another consultancy firm,
further made the recommendation to the Hong Kong government that "having regard to the
fact that there is in general a lack of capital for small software companies in Hong Kong, [we]
recommend that the government should establish a small business loan program to finance
these companies." 'x Many leaders in Hong Kong agree with these findings that a primary
barrier to the growth of the indigenous industry is the lack of capital available to the
individual firms. Furthermore, a great deal of energy is being spent by these leaders in Hong
Kong to address this problem in the hopes that it will invigorate the indigenous software
industry.
This chapter tries to put into perspective how important domestic capital markets are to
the formation and development of a software industry. The important role that capital
markets play in an industry is the ability to raise money through a variety of means. The two
possible ways of raising money are via equity and debt. Software companies, especially
younger and smaller ones, have more limited options. Since the product of a software
company comes in the form of a piece of intellectual property, debt is usually more difficult
(although not impossible) to raise by these younger, smaller companies given their lack of
collateral. Thus, equity financing becomes an even more important tool in financing
growth than it might be to other industries. Because of the disproportionate importance of
equity in financing young software companies, this chapter will primarily focus on financing
via venture capital (VC) and initial public offering (IPO) opportunities.
This chapter is divided into four main sections. Section 2 looks at the role of the equity
markets in financing the Hong Kong software industry. Section 3 looks at the role domestic
equity markets have played in developing the software industries of our comparison
economies-the US, India, Ireland, and Israel. Finally, section 5 draws together the findings in
Hong Kong and our comparison economies to answer the question of how critical strong
domestic capital markets are to initiating growth in Hong Kong's software industry.
4.2 EQUITY MARKETS IN HONG KONG
4.2.1 INTRODUCTION
The section looks at how VC and IPO opportunities in Hong Kong are affecting Hong
Kong's indigenous software industry. First, I present an overview of the types of venture
capital opportunities available in Hong Kong. Second, with that understanding, I then
examine possible reasons why VC firms may not be investing in Hong Kong software
companies. Third, I try to develop an understanding of the direction of causality between the
lack of investment in Hong Kong software firms and the lack of a software industry in Hong
Kong. Finally, I conclude this section with the goal of understanding the true role capital
markets have played in affecting the growth of Hong Kong's indigenous software industry.
4.2.2 VENTURE CAPITAL IN HONG KONG
While venture capital exists in Hong Kong, instances of VC money going into high-tech
Hong Kong firms are few and far between. According to Raymond Ch'ien, a leading Hong
Kong industrialist, "to Asian investors, if VC in high-tech is not a dirty word, it is a dangerous
word." iv To understand why this is so, it is first important to understand the extent of Hong
Kong's VC industry and what that industry invests in.
Hong Kong's VC industry is home to some of the largest VC firms in the world. These
firms include AIG, Prudential Asia, Advent International, Walden International Investment
Group, Hambrecht & Quist, and TransPac to name a few. In all, as of May 1998, the Hong
Kong Venture Capital Association (Hong KongVCA) had 54 full members, all of whom are
firms or individuals participating in venture capitalxli. Research by the capital market's team of
the MBHong Kong study characterized the type of funds these large VC firms operatex ii
According to the research, many of these funds are set up with relatively long investment
horizons targeted at well established companies. Furthermore, while these funds are located in
Hong Kong, many actually focus on investing in business expansion or infrastructure
projects in China. Hong Kong's VC money also goes to the domestic property market. The
factors that seem most behind drawing money to China and to the property market in Hong
Kong has been their relatively high returns without correspondingly high risk. These factors
also seem to be some of the most important reasons for the lack of interest by VC's in the
high-tech sector. The table below characterizes several of Hong Kong's major VC firms and
funds. It highlights the typically large minimum investments and the focus on mezzanine
investments.
BancBoston Capital
Citicorp Capital Asia
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette
Asia Ltd.
HSBC Private Equity
Management Ltd.
US$3-10 M
US$2-15 M
US$ 10 M
N/A
Firms with greater than US$2 M
in operating profit and pre-IPO
Prefers to give expansion and
mezzanine funding
Companies with a valuation of
greater than US$50 M or track
record of strong profitability.
Established profitable companies
which require additional capital
to expand. Start-ups are only
considered under special
circumstances.
Schroder Capital Partners (Asia)
Limited
US$ 10-100 M Growth opportunities in the
manufacture and distribution of
consumer products and services.
Table 6: Characterization of VCfunds in Hong Kongl
Anecdotal data provided further evidence of the investment behavior of Hong Kong's VC
firms. As one senior executive at a major international VC firm known for its investments in
high-tech in Asia. put it, "Hong Kong doesn't have a mentality for investing in high-tech."
One of the founding members of the Hong KongVCA further describes the dearth of VC
money targeted at start-ups, high-tech or otherwise. In his experience, he "has not seen a
young company [in Hong Kong] where plant and equipment wasn't financed by 1 year loans."
Those in the software industry also provided ample supporting evidence for the dearth of VC
money going to software firms. Of the 12 software firms interviewed, none had received
venture capital or had heard of anyone else receiving it. As person M describes, "I've never
met one bold enough to invest in software."
4.2.3 WHY VC'S DON'T INVEST IN HONG KONG
Why don't VC firms invest in Hong Kong software companies? The leading reason cited
by fund mangers during interviews was that there is no exit for high risk, high-tech start-upsxlii
Industrialists in Hong Kong have also cited the challenge of taking young high-tech companies
public as a key barrier to the growth of the high-tech industry. During a public address on
ways to promote high-tech in Hong Kong, Dr. Raymond Ch'ien, a leading Hong Kong
industrialist and the chief technology policy maker in Hong Kong, stated that "I think the
time is right for a NADAQ. We need to give investors an exit."liv Mr. Herbert Hui, deputy
CEO of the Hong KongSE, agreed, stating in the newspaper that, in order to promote high-
tech, Hong Kong needs to figure out how to list technology companies and how to educate
investors on how to invest in high-tech companiesxliii. This focus by many on creating an exit
for investors in Hong Kong seems to be consistent with the findings of the MBHong Kong
research team on why fund managers in Hong Kong seem not to be investing in high-tech
companies.
The listing requirements of the Hong KongSE are a major obstacle to exit. In order to be
eligible for listing, a company is required to have approximately US$2 M in profits in the year
prior to listing, and must have had a combined profit level of about US$ 3 M in the two years
prior to that. Companies must have an initial market capitalization of about US$10 M and
must offer at least US$ 5 M in shares to the publicxliv. These requirements, especially the ones
regarding profitability, are very difficult to achieve for young high-tech companies. The result
has been that, of the 542 companies listed on the Hong KongSE, only 15 could be classified as
"technology" companies--even when using the most broad definition of what defines a
technology companyxlii
What those advocating the importance of exit are essentially saying is that there are great
high-tech companies in Hong Kong that are not realizing their potential because they can't go
public on the Hong KongSE. This simply does not make sense. If there are high technology
companies in Hong Kong with internationally competitive products, investors would then
have the option of exiting by going public on NASDAQ or exiting via the sale of the
company to an MNC. Israel presents an important example of how foreign high-tech
companies utilize the US capital markets to provide an exit. For example, 1996 saw 13 Israeli
companies go public on NASDAQ. As of early 1998, over 100 Israeli companies, mostly high-
tech, now trade on the NASDAQ marketxv. Probably the most famous is Checkpoint
software. With seed capital of $300,000 in 1993, it went public on NASDAQ in 1996. Based
on the December '97 share price, the company is worth almost $1.2 billion. Other Israeli high-
tech companies on NASDAQ include Elbit Vision Systems, and VocalTec, leaders in the field
of computer vision and Internet telephony respectively. Among foreign countries, Israel ranks
second only to Canada in the number of companies traded on US stock exchanges, but
Islaeri firms are certainly not the only ones to use NASDAQ as an exit vehicle.xvi In 1996, 15
European companies and 5 Asian companies also went public on NASDAQxlv. An Irish
newspaper described the reason why high-tech foreign companies look to list in the US: "until
Irish investors realize the potential of technology stocks, local companies feel they have little
option but to look abroad for sources of additional capital. "xlvii Bill McCabe, Chairman of Irish
software firm CBT, states that they chose NASDAQ for an IPO because "the NASDAQ
market understands and knows how to value technical companies." xlvii NASDAQ is extremely
favorable to foreign listings. In fact, NASDAQ lists more non-US companies than both the
NYSE and AMEX combined"'viii.
If there are world class high technology start-ups in Hong Kong, buyouts or acquisitions
would give investors another option to recover their capital. In the US, acquisition exits
outpaced IPOs for the three years including 1987, 1988, and 1989xix. Acquisitions have also
acted as important exit vehicles in Israel and Ireland. In Israel, many high-tech MNCs acquire
young Israeli high-tech companies for their superior technology and engineering talent. The
list of US companies acquiring Israeli firms reads as a who's-who of Silicon Valley. Acquirers
of Isreali firms include Siemens, Applied Materials, US Robotics, and Bay Networksxvi. In
Ireland, many successful high-tech start-ups also choose to be acquired by European MNCs
instead of going public. Thus, if there are startups in Hong Kong producing world class
products and technologies (the types of companies that are fundamental to the growth of an
industry in an economy with a small domestic market), then evidence shows that investors
would have a variety of exit opportunities.
A second major issue mentioned by many as to why VC firms may not be investing in
high-tech in Hong Kong was mentioned previously. This was the issue of alternative
investment opportunities in China and in Hong Kong real estate which provide relatively high
returns without the corresponding risk. The basic argument is that there is no money for
high-tech in Hong Kong because it is being invested in more lucrative opportunities elsewhere.
Raymond Ch'ien commented that there is "no tradition of VC [in high tech] because of
property.liv" Research from the MBHong Kong sector on capital markets also concluded that:
However, there is a discrepancy with the argument many are making about the lack of
technology oriented funds and its impact on Hong Kong's high-tech sector. First, it hasn't
always been the case that there has been a lack of technology oriented VC funds in Hong
Kong. Walden International Investment Group, a major international VC firm, started a fund
in Hong Kong in the mid-1980's with a focus on hi-tech. However, they had to broaden their
focus due to disappointing returns and the low volume of potential investmentsx"'ii. In the case
of Walden, the money was there but the investment opportunities-the companies-were not.
Even in the late 1990s, one cannot say that there is an absence of venture capital available
to promising high tech companies in Hong Kong. In the case of Walden, just because they
have broadened their focus doesn't mean they don't invest in high-tech anymore. During a
business conference in November 1996, Walden said they invested more in Asian software
companies than they did in US onesiv. In December 1997, Walden closed their $328 million
PacVen Walden Venture IV fund. This fund will focus on eight countries around Asia and
will make investments from $2 to $15 M, but "investments in early-stage technology deals tend
to be $2 to $3 M because of the risk associated with those types of deals." While the eight
countries in Asia were not specified, the fund excludes Korea and Japan, and Walden has few
investments in Malaysia, Indonesia, or the Philippines and none in Thailand. Thus, it would
"Opportunities in property and opportunities in China, either manufacturing or
property, remain attractive due to the expectation of continued high returns. The
lack of investment in start-up companies in Hong Kong and, especially, in high-
technology companies is less surprising in the presence of these appealing alternative
investments. lii
be surprising if there weren't an opportunity for early-stage technology companies in Hong
Kong to receive money from this fund. Furthermore, half of all of the funds are allocated to
the technology sector because "Walden has a competitive advantage in technology"'. While
the table above shows that about 10% of VC firms that belong the Hong KongVCA would
not make appropriate investors in software start-ups, there are others in addition to Walden
that seem like they would. For example, Donaldson, Lufkin, Jenrett's VC subsidiary in Hong
Kong targets "small and medium businesses with a strong management team and credible
business plan." They also state that they are a "value added" VC firm that "bring[s] equity and
a total business solution" to their portfolio of companies. ACL is a Hong Kong based VC firm
which manages two funds totaling almost $30 M. These funds are focused on "healthcare,
communications and information technology, consumer services, leisure and, most recently,
affordable housing in the Philippines.""' While many leaders in Hong Kong had talked about
the high return, low risk investment opportunities in property as a reason why Hong Kong
VC firms did not invest in Hong Kong high-tech, there is the counter-example of Nomura
Securities' Hong Kong VC branch, which looks to make investments between US$1 M and
US$5 M in "any industry except property.xli" Also, while there were no examples uncovered
of software companies receiving VC money, that is not to say that none was offered. Charter
Venture Capital, a VC firm with a branch in Hong Kong, offered to take a majority stake in a
local Hong Kong software start-up company called Creature House. The offer was made
because Creature House had very innovative technology that could be used in packaged
graphic design software. Besides Walden, Transpac is the other major VC firm that focuses on
the high-tech sector in Asia. In 1996, they had a total of eight funds worth US$560 M"'. Even
as early as 1991, they had investments totaling US$200 M. While a large portion of the funds
get targeted at Hong Kong companies looking to regionalize their operations, Transpac says
they "specialize in the provision of seed funding and start up funding. . ." Furthermore, as of
1991, they had equity interests in 16 companies in Hong Kong which were hi-tech industry-
orientedliii. More recently, Transkpac's president, Dr. Christopher Leong (an MIT
alumnus), confirmed that his company makes numerous investments in technology companies
in Asia, especially Taiwan and Singapore. As they did in the early 1990's, Mr. Leong's
company certainly has the ability to continue to invest in Hong Kong high-tech companies,
however, "in terms of technology, in the long run, Hong Kong will lag behind Singapore and
Taiwan. . .[and that] It lags behind Taiwan by a lot [now]. "liv Thus, while many say
investment opportunities in China and in Hong Kong property are preventing capital from
flowing into the high tech sector, the lack of capital flow may be due more to the dearth of
investment opportunities in Hong Kong's high tech sector.
4.2.4 WHAT IS THE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP?
While we have a picture of why Hong Kong VC firms don't invest in Hong Kong
software firms, the question of the direction of causality has still yet to be determined.
Specifically, is the cause of Hong Kong high-tech industry's restricted growth due to the lack
of capital, or is there a lack of capital because there are few companies to invest in? One could
imagine that the answer could be both in the sense that it is a "chicken and egg" problem. In
fact, according to the chapter on capital markets in the MBHong Kong book, the researchers
describe the problem as "a vicious circle where the lack of investors and the lack of
entrepreneurs feed on each other."x Raymond Ch'ien also states that "...we are going to
aggressively market our hi-tech industry to venture capitalists in Europe and the US because
we have to break the chicken and egg problem." iv
While the outcome may be a 'vicious circle,' the circle may have been created by the
dearth of companies with internationally competitive products. Data from the previous
section showed that there was in fact a technology focused VC fund specifically in the Hong
Kong region, but that it had to broaden its investment criteria due to the lack of potential
investments. Aggregate data on the Asian venture capital industry shows that a total of $19.7
billion was invested in 18,172 companies in 1996. Investment in 1996 alone was about $5.5
billion. Money invested in Asia (excluding Japan) broken down by industry shows that
investments in electronics-related and computer-related investments were ranked in second and
third place taking 14.7% and 13.5% of Asian VC dollars respectively. This was behind
industrial products which took 24.3% of the dollars. Excluding Japan, the breakdown of
venture capital distributed by stage of venture expansion accounting for 48%, start-up at 24%,
and mezzanine at 14% of total disbursements. (note: the term "start-up" used here typically
refers to long-standing family businesses that incorporate themselves). When we include
Japan, 5% of the $19.7 billion invested in Asia, or almost $1 billion went to companies at the
"seed" stage. Disbursements broken down by geographic location (excluding Japan), shows
that Korea (16.9%) is the top location for VC investments with Hong Kong and Singapore
just behind at 10.8% and 8.2% respectivelyv. While, as a percentage of the whole, there is not
a lot of capital going for seed capital, in absolute terms it is not insignificant. Furthermore, in
Asia, technology is an important sector for VC and Hong Kong is an important part of Asia
for VC. However, despite this, we still don't see many success stories of venture backed
software companies coming from Hong Kong.
The causal relationship between funding opportunities and industry growth in Hong Kong
stands in direct contrast to the case of Israel. In Israel there is clear evidence that the industry
did not grow initially because of a lack of venture capital. According to Yigal Erlich, the
former Chief Scientist at the Israeli Ministry of Industry and Trade, "we found that despite a
tripling of start-ups in the early 1990s, there was no corresponding increase in the commercial
success rate." Because of this, in 1993, Erlich started Yozma Venture Capital Ltd, an Israeli
state owned company that established venture capital funds and shared the risk with foreign
investors. Yozma started 10 funds and the government put in $100 M while the international
partners put in an additional $150 M. Of the companies the Yozma funds first invested in,
over 20 went public in the US and over a dozen have been acquired by MNCs. This success
encouraged more money to flow into existing funds and for more funds to be created.
However, despite all the money going into the Israeli VC market in recent years, one fund
manager in Israel who just completed raising $110 million recently said that "even with twice
as much money, we'd still face the problem of deciding between the many good
opportunities." This is quite a different story from the fact that there are funds focusing on
high technology in Asia, but that those funds are making minimal investments in Hong Kong.
Further evidence regarding the seeming dearth of VC directed at high-tech in Hong Kong
came from the comments of Hong Kong software company leaders themselves. When asked
to talk about the major barriers they face in growing their companies, only 2 of 11 software
companies said it was because of a lack of money. Seven of eleven said a major barrier was
people, and six of 11 said it was finding the right business partners. While person M, manager
of one of the two companies stating that more capital was important, said "we need loans or
venture capital now to expand our market,,." he added that "we're looking for partners with
complementary assets, not just money." While findings show that software companies in
Hong Kong are undercapitalized in general, data from the software companies themselves
seems to say that this is not the major barrier to their growth.
4.2.5 CONCLUSION
While many people in Hong Kong have cited the lack of technology focused VC funds as a
major factor restricting the development of Hong Kong's high-tech sector, two major pieces of
evidence suggest otherwise. First, VC funds focused on Asia and focused on funding early
early-stage technology firms do exist. Walden had a VC fund focused on high-tech in Hong
Kong and there still exists today a variety of VC funds focused on high-tech in Asia.
However, the Walden fund had to broaden its focus due to the lack of investment
opportunities and the other funds seem to focus on Taiwan and Singapore because the firms
coming from those countries seem to have a stronger technological basis. Second, the heads of
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Hong Kong software firms don't even cite the lack of VC as a major barrier to their
growth. Instead, they talk more about the difficulty of finding good employees and business
partners.
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4.3 THE ROLE OF VC AND IPO'S IN THE COMPAIRISON ECONOMIES
4.3.1 INTRODUCTION
This section looks briefly at the role of venture capital and IPO opportunities in the
comparison economies of the US, Israel, Ireland and India in order to better understand how
VC affects the growth of an industry.
4.3.2 THE US
Although researchers have shown how VC money has been behind the growth of major
new U.S. industries such as semiconductors, computers, and biotechnology, it is less clear that
VC money was responsible for the growth of these industries. Between 1967 and 1972, almost
thirty semiconductor companies were started with VC money including National
Semiconductor, Intel, and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD). However, in 1968, the
semiconductor industry already had over a billion dollars in annual sales, with only a handful
of VC backed firms contributing to that figure. In the computer industry, while DEC helped
pioneer minicomputers in 1957 with the help of venture capital, there was already a
tremendous amount of people and research in the computer field. For example, in 1957,
IBM's computer division already had sales of $1 billionvi. While the first biotechnology
company was started by a venture capitalist, the foundation for the industry had already been
laid by the large investment in biotech research by the National Institutes of Health (NIH).
While venture capital backed companies were important in expanding these industries, there
was a critical mass of research and people involved in these industries already.
A recent survey of companies founded by MIT alumni also gives an interesting perspective
on the role of VC in the US. Among software firms started by MIT alumni the table below
shows the relative importance of different sources of financing:
Founder's Personal Savings
Company Cash Flow
Strategic Partners
Founder's Family
Venture Capital Firms
Informal Investors
Commercial Banks
Founder's Friends
US Government
3.92
3.58
.8
.74
.57
.55
.46
.31
.28
Table 7: Importance offunding sources for MIT related software firms ii
Thus, while many in Hong Kong cite the issue that most VC is critical to creating a
software industry in Hong Kong, the table above shows that, even among MIT-related
software companies, venture capital did not play an important role in financing the average
venture's start. Like all of the software companies we interviewed in Hong Kong, personal
savings followed by company cash flow were the most important sources of financing for the
MIT related software companies.
4.3.3 INDIA
The success of India's software industry to date has had little to do with venture capital.
According to a recent statement by K.V. Ramani, President of India's National Association of
Software and Service Companies (Nasscom) , "Venture capital funds have made minimal
impact on the Indian software industry. . ."viii Given the type of software India's industry
focuses on (i.e. custom software), this statement makes a great deal of sense. India's
software companies do not need to invest in R&D or marketing and thus can generate positive
cash flows relatively quickly. However, based almost entirely on professional services alone,
India has created an indigenous software industry which generates almost $2 billion per year
and which is growing at 30%-50% per year. The most fundamental reason many cite for this is
the quality of the engineering labor force in India and the quality of the services they offer.
Many also note that the low cost of Indian software is a current advantage. However,
according to MNC representatives, the cost advantage is only temporary and it is the quality
of software engineering talent that is encouraging them to make long-term investments in the
Indian software indsutry.
In order to take the Indian software industry to the next level of growth, many see VC
money as playing a crucial role. According to Mr. Dewang Mehta, Executive Director of
Nasscom, "for the software industry in India to reach an annual turnover of $ 6 billion by the
year 2000, it requires at least $500 M of venture capital funds. . ."ix This seems to be a
somewhat similar pattern to the semiconductor and computer industry's development in the
US. Once a critical mass of trained and experienced people are already in the industry and
once that industry has grown to a certain size, venture capital helps to accelerate the rate of
company formation and industry growth.
4.3.4 IRELAND
The strength of the Irish software industry has developed because of MNCs' decisions to
locate in that country. The growth of the MNC-led software industry in Ireland, as described
in the chapter on human resources, seems to have been primarily caused by the quality of the
workforce but also by various government incentives. In this respect, venture capital had very
little to do with Ireland becoming one of the top 5 software exporting countries in the world.
In terms of the indigenous software industry, venture capital seems to be more
important to the expansion rather than the creation of successful firms. Many indigenous
software companies that receive VC funding are already relatively successful on an
international level. For example, an Irish venture capital firm named ICC invested in an Irish
software firm named RFT Vision systems. While the company had only 8 people, it was 3
years old, profitable, and expecting to do 1 million pounds in business that year. Before the
time of VC investment, RFT had already been selling its product to major corporations such
as Guinness, Harris Corp, and Panasonic, and had a number of partnership arrangements with
US companies. In fact, RFT was one of the youngest companies that ICC had invested in.
ICC only did so because RFT's products were "highly innovative and because their directors
were all very experienced in the industry."" The managing director of ICC, speaking in
general about his industry, says that Irish VC firms tend to invest only after the product is well
establishedi. Delta Partners is another prominent venture capital firm in Ireland. One
investment made by Delta was in an Irish software firm called Westboro. However, by the
time of investment, Westboro had already achieved various milestones of success. At the time
of investment by Delta, Westboro was 5 years old, had 25 people, and "already had a number
of Fortune 500 companies among its clients.""" Delta also made an investment in an Irish
banking software company named Credo; however, at the time of the investment, Credo was
8 years old-relatively far from the seed or start-up phase.1xiii IONA, an Irish software firm
focusing on the software tools market, didn't have any money, VC or otherwise, to invest in
marketing when it started out. They built their brand, and their success, by selling a 60-day
trial version of their product for 5% of the purchase price. If people liked it, they could
purchase the full version for the remaining 95%.lxi The result is that IONA is the leader in the
world in its market and is a public company on the NASDAQ.
The case of Ireland suggests that successful software companies are usually successful
before they get venture capital funding. Even while they are relatively young and small, they
still have internationally competitive products and international customers. Venture
capital in Ireland, as in Hong Kong, seems to be at the mezzanine level where it helps already
successful firms to grow.
4.3.5 ISRAEL
Venture capital played an important part in the development of Israel's high tech industry,
but it was not the first component. As described in the chapter on source organizations, Israel
has had a long history of investment in innovative R&D, and, as described in the chapter on
human resources, has a highly trained workforce. Thus, the infrastructure for a technology
industry was being cultivated long before the capital became available. The inflow of capital
was also preceded by strong incentives for Israeli engineers to start their own companies. Since
the government was cutting back on military programs, thousands of engineers were fired.
Given that the core technology had already been developed, and that the best alternative for
Israel's brightest engineering talent was to go and start their own company, the venture capital
money helped to grow the industry. In the Israeli case, the evidence seems to present a clear
set of conditions which existed which then allowed venture capital to have a positive impact
on the industry. However, as discussed throughout this thesis, whether or not Hong Kong
has those prerequisite conditions is in question.
4.3.6 CONCLUSION
A major lesson provided by all four comparison economies is that venture capital cannot
grow what is not there. In each of the cases, there is already something that is successful about
the industry and venture capital helps to expand that success.
4.5 CONCLUSION
Many people in Hong Kong use the following logic to describe the effect of the domestic
capital markets on the local software industry: Because there is no domestic exit for young
high-tech firms, there is no VC money for those young high-tech firms. Because there is no
money for them, the development of high-tech industry is being stymied. This then creates a
negative spiral in which the dearth of high-tech companies and the dearth of high-tech oriented
VC firms feeds off of each other. However, the evidence presented in this chapter raises
questions about this logic. First, firms which have internationally competitive products have
the opportunity to go public on the NASDAQ. Like India, Ireland, and Israel, Hong Kong's
relatively small domestic market for most types of software means that it has to focus on the
export market if it wants to develop a software industry. Good software companies are also
important acquisition targets for MNCs. Thus, the issue of an exit does not seem to be as big a
barrier as most in Hong Kong assert. Second, it is not clear that there is a lack of VC funds in
Asia focused on high-tech. Given the existence of Walden and Transpac, companies that say
they target early-stage high-tech companies in countries like Hong Kong, we would expect that
companies in Hong Kong that had internationally competitive products or services could get
financing. Finally, it is not clear that VC money has to be behind the start of an industry or a
company for it be internationally competitive. This is suggested by our comparison
economies but it is also evident in Hong Kong. Creature House is a Hong Kong software
company which makes graphic design software. Its product, Expression, marketed by Fractal
Design Corporation, was named as one of the top ten products of the year by Computer
Artist Magazine in 1996, and is a top selling graphics package used around the world. Despite
this, the firm does not have venture capital funding. Prima Design is another Hong Kong
software company. It develops CAM/CAD software for the textile industry, and its product
is a global leader. However, it too does not use money from venture capital firms. Thus,
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despite what many think about the importance of exit vehicles or venture capital funding,
the data shows that other elements needed to initiate the growth of Hong Kong's software
industry may be more fundamental.
5. HUMAN RESOURCES
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In the high-technology sector, the growth of a company ultimately depends on the quality
of its people. Software companies are no exception. The product of a software company is a
piece of software which addresses a customer's problem. It is up to the creativity and
ingenuity of the software engineer to help figure out what the problem is and how to solve
that problem in the most effective way. In understanding the barriers to growth of a software
industry, a key variable to assess is the overall quality of engineers in software companies and
the factors that drive that level of quality.
In order to do this, I first came up with a model which generally describes the flow of
people into the software industry. The model is shown in the figure below.
'V7 ] Potential V P x-7
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Figure 7: Human Resources Model
The model operates as follows. First, a pool of quality potential employees is created
via quality education and training. In my research, "education" primarily focuses on the
tertiary education sector while "training" looks at non-academic work experience. People
who are educated and trained in software development become potential employees for a firm.
The quality level of their education and training determines the quality level of the pool of
potential employees. The level of quality of engineers in a firm or industry depends on the
ability to attract quality engineers and retain them, but more fundamentally, it depends on the
quality of the education and training of all engineers in a given labor market.
My analysis used this model in two steps. First, I sought to understand the quality level of
current employees. This was assessed via primary and secondary data collected from
employers of software engineers who assessed their manpower in both an absolute sense and
relative to those educated and trained elsewhere. Second, I sought to understand what is
driving the quality level of engineers in a given software industry. To do this, I analyzed each
of the factors which determine the quality level of engineers in an industry. These include the
quality level of education and training, and the industry's ability to attract and retain quality
people.
By applying this method of analysis to Hong Kong and to our comparison economies, the
goal is to better understand the extent to which the quality level of people affects the growth
of a software industry. This chapter is divided into several sections. The first step, in section
2, is to develop a broad understanding of how important quality people are in helping to drive
the growth of a software industry. This is accomplished by looking at the software industries
of our comparison economies-the US, India, Ireland, and Israel-and assessing what people
say about the quality level of their people and how that level of quality has contributed to the
growth of their software industry. Results from section 2 confirm the importance of this
factor. Section 3 then looks at how employers rate the quality of software engineers in Hong
Kong. Results from this section show that there is almost universal concern about the quality
of engineers both in an absolute sense and relative to engineers from abroad. In order to
understand why quality is perceived to be so low, the education and training of Hong Kong
engineers, the most fundamental factor affecting the manpower quality in an industry, is
analyzed in Section 4. Results show that the way engineers in HK are being educated and
trained is causing the problems that employers are citing about their workforce. Section 5
explores the ability of Hong Kong's indigenous software industry to attract and retain quality
people. Here, we find that the human resource strategies of Hong Kong firms need to be
changed if the industry wants to see the increased participation of more talented people in
their companies. Finally, Section 6 integrates the lessons learned from our comparison
economies and from Hong Kong.
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5.2 QUALITY LEVEL OF ENGINEERS IN COMPARISON ECONOMIES
5.2.1 OVERVIEW
This section looks at the quality level of engineers in our comparison economies-the US,
India, Ireland, and Israel. This comparison is primarily done by looking at what firms, both
indigenous and multinational, publicly say about the quality of the engineers they find in
these countries. We will show that, in each of our comparison economies, the quality of
engineers is rated very positively, and that the positive quality level is an important factor
contributing to the growth of software firms and the industry in that economy.
5.2.2 THE US
It is hard to assess in the aggregate how employers rate the quality of US software
engineers. Even so, one can look at successful firms and assess the extent to which they talk
about the quality of their people, and the importance of this factor in their success. The most
famous example of a successful software firm in the US is Microsoft. Microsoft's view towards
building its success on the quality of its people has been well articulated by its chairman, Bill
Gates. According to Gates, "there is no way of getting around [the fact] that, in terms of IQ,
you've got to be very elitist in picking the people who deserve to write software. .. " Gates
continues that the philosophy of Microsoft is to bias their hiring decision "toward intelligence
over anything else, even, in many cases, experience." l iv Clearly, Microsoft sees it as
fundamental to its success that it has access to the best and brightest software engineers.
Cisco Systems is another example of how successful US high-tech firms strive to
ensure that the quality level of their workforce is high. Cisco Systems, which makes hardware
and software for computer networks, has seen sales grow 300% in two years--from $2 billion in
1995 to over $6 billion in 1997. To achieve this type of growth, Cisco has the "goal of
getting the top 10-15% of people in our industry" according to their CEO, John Chambers x .
Because Cisco realizes that talented people are probably not looking for jobs, it spends a lot of
time trying to get good people from other companies. One approach it often uses is through
simply acquiring the other company. It will often acquire companies to get their talent-
regardless of the actual product the company may be developing. Furthermore, to encourage
talented engineers to join Cisco, the CEO will even personally call potential employees-even
those at the entry level position. This type of commitment to attracting top talent underscores
the extent to which Cisco believes getting the best people is the key to their success.
While it is very difficult to do a complete analysis in assessing the quality level of the
workforce in successful US high-tech firms, these examples serve to illuminate the point that
successful US high-tech companies find obtaining a high overall level of workforce quality
critical to their success.
5.2.3 INDIA
Many researchers point to the development of India's software industry as having
important roots in the high quality of the people in that industry. Balasubramanam and
Balasubramanam attribute the growth of software in India to three main factors, all of which
have to do with the quality of people in the industryxvi. According to their research:
"There are several economic and sociological explanationsfor the birth and rapid growth of
software in India. First, the endowments of human capital referred to above, a product of
India's education policies over the years which emphasised investments in tertiary
education. Second, is the contribution of expatriate Indians to the growth of the sector.
Third, several managers of software firms attribute India's comparative advantage in
software to the innate mathematical abilities ofIndians. "
In terms of tertiary education, Bangalore alone, one of India's largest software producing
cities, has 3 universities, 14 engineering colleges and 47 polytechnic universities. The total
number of computer scientists graduating from Indian universities averages 15,000 per year.
To put this in perspective, this is just shy of the 18,000 students gradating from all of Hong
Kong's universities in all disciplines each year. Stremlau (1996) also argues that expatriate
Indians further fueled the industry by bringing their expertise from having worked and trained
in major high-tech corporations in the US.'xvii
The quality of software professionals in India is described best by the people who
employ them. One such company is Motorola. Motorola India Electronics Ltd. is only one of
3 companies in the world which has achieved the highest level rating, a level 5 rating, on
Carnegie Mellon University's Capabilities Maturity Model (CMM), a model for rating the
quality of software being produced by a given company. The only other two companies in the
world to achieve this rating are both in the US and include Boeing's Defense and Space Group,
and IBM Federal Systems Co. (now part of Lockheed Martin). Amreesh Modi, Managing
Director of Motorola's Global Software Division says "we are in India because that's where a
lot of talent is. . .the cost advantage is a short-term bonus." Motorola is not the only
company that that has recognized the ability of Indian engineers to produce high quality
software. Scott Bayman, General Electric's country manager in India, commented that the
software quality in India is ". . .slightly ahead of what we get done in the US in our
experience." The quality of the software engineering pool has prompted others including
Lucent, Computer Associates, Hewlett-Packard, Northern Telecom, IBM, and ATT to open
or think about opening software development centers in India. Furthermore, Oracle
Corporation will use an operating system largely developed by the company's India
Development Center in Bangalore to power their recently announced Network Computer
or NC x
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Both researchers and executives of multinational companies have found the quality of
Indian software engineers to be relatively high. This high level of quality has led US firms to
entrust their information systems development increasingly to indigenous Indian software
consulting companies, and has prompted many high-tech multinationals to set up development
centers based in India. The results of these activities have been to drive the growth of software
exports from India to between 40% and 50% per year.
5.2.4 IRELAND
Evidence from Ireland also suggests that there is a relatively high quality pool of
professionals involved in the high-tech sector. According to Finn Gallen, the Vice-President of
Ireland's Industrial Development Agency (IDA):
"The biggest thing we have to offer US high-tech companies is skilled, English
speaking labor-the people. We try to identify, 10 years in advance, the kind of
investment that we can expect from overseas, particularly in electronics and
software. A large part of our success lies in training ahead of time, the right type of
peoplefor the high-tech sector."i
Irish officials started making these investments in education as early as the 1960's.xix
Ireland built its Technical College system in the late 1960's offering certificate and diploma
courses. It also created two technically focused National Institutes of Higher Education (in
1972 and 1980) that both received full university status in 1989. While these investments in
education were geared to attract high-tech multinationals to Ireland, they also had
unintentional benfits for the indigenous high-tech industryxx. Irish Prime Minister John
Bruston further corroborates the effects of the well-trained high-tech workforce in Ireland. He
says that "there is a clear indication that the investments that we've made in education,
particularly in electronics, have been very, very effective in attracting industry to Ireland.
.the age profile and the educational profile of Ireland has been very helpful to this takeoff of
our economy"'lxxi Thus, there is no lack of belief among Ireland's most senior officials that the
growth of their high-tech industry has been driven in an important way by the quality of the
local people.
Comparative data on Ireland's education system further enforces the story told by the Irish
officials above. The Irish government invests 7% of GNP in education, and 60% of the
current student population is studying computing, engineering, electronics, science or business
based courses. The proportion of students completing secondary education is the highest in the
European Union, and, according to the 1996 IMD World Competitiveness Report, the quality
of Ireland's educational system was ranked ahead of Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Spain,
Portugal, and the UKxxii
Anecdotal evidence from high-tech multinationals locating in Ireland further supports the
argument that the quality level of the workforce plays an important role in driving the growth
of the high-tech industry. Of 20 large high-tech multinationals surveyed, 16 said the labor
pool was a prime reason for choosing Ireland as a locationx. The case of Intel Ireland is
illustrative. Intel chose Ireland as the location of its only manufacturing facility in Europe in
1994. The facility employs more than 2,600 workers, almost all of whom are Irish. The
success of this facility has prompted Intel to invest a further $1.5 billion in Ireland in a new
facility which will create another 2,000 jobs. What were the factors that encouraged Intel to
invest to this degree in Ireland? Certainly tax holidays and other financial incentives given by
the government played a roll. However, according to Frank McCabe, a vice-president at Intel
and general manager of Intel Ireland, "the major attraction for Intel originally in locating in
Ireland was the quality of the education system and the quality of the people it produces."
Mr. McCabe adds that "the results to date confirm the original assessment."
'
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Thus, as with India and the US, Ireland presents another strong example that having an
adequate supply of well-educated and trained people in a high-tech industry is at least one key
driver of that industry's success.
5.2.5 ISRAEL
As with the other comparison economies mentioned previously, Israel's high technology
boom seems to have important roots in the quality of its labor pool. Proof of this talent can
be seen in the types of responsibility multinational high-tech companies are giving to their
Israeli development centers. In 1994, Motorola Communications in Israel became the
exclusive development site of wireless data communications for the entire companylxxiv. IBM
opened a research lab in Israel 25 years ago at the Technion and, in 1982, opened one of its 8
major research laboratories in the city of Haifa. This lab is now IBM's 3rd largest research
facility in the world in terms of number of employees. It falls behind IBM's main research
facility, the T.J. Watson center in New York, and the Almaden research center in Silicon
Valleyxxv. The Intel processor with MMX technology, the P55C, was developed, debugged,
and tested all in Israel. Also, Microsoft developed its Internet firewall technology, MS Proxy
Server, in Israel. As important as the actual technical accomplishments themselves is the fact
that the parent companies believed strongly enough in the quality of the work force in Israel
to make the investments that would lead to these technologies being produced.
Related evidence also speaks to the quality of Israeli engineers. Microsoft originally set up
a facility in Israel because it did not want to lose Israeli engineers who wanted to return home.
EMC, a $3 billion dollar US firm leading the world in storage systems and software, has Israeli
engineers comprising almost 8% of its R&D staff at its US headquarters. It invested
millions of dollars in opening a development center in Israel because it was afraid of losing
their Israeli engineers who were becoming homesickxvi.
Evidence suggests that the quality of the labor force stems from an important combination
of quality educational and training experiences. Israel's premier university of science and
technology is the Technion. Its department of computer science one of the most selective in
the country, taking only students with the highest scores. This is in direct contrast with Hong
Kong, where many say the best students don't even go into engineering'. In Israel, overall,
28% of the population is college educated compared to 31% for Silicon Valley. The leading
edge work experience opportunities for the country's engineers was initially provided by the
Israeli military. The demanding technology needs of the Israeli military fueled much of the
groundbreaking research at the Technion, and provided an opportunity for its students and
faculty to work on some of the most challenging technology issues.xxvii The concentration of
engineering talent also fueled multinationals to set up R&D centers in Israel which further
contributed to high quality training opportunities for local engineers. Israel was ranked first in
concentration of engineers in a 1995 survey with 140 per 10,000 in the labor force. This
compares to 80/10,000 in the US, 75/10,000 in Japan, and 10/10,000 in Hong Kong.
However, the concentration of engineering talent in Israel was not only due to the education
and training opportunities. Israel received additional talented manpower from the former
Soviet Union. Russian immigration increased Israel's population by 12% in the years between
1990 and 1993. Many of these immigrants brought with them specialized science and
engineering skillsxxviii.
While a confluence of many factors led to the overall success of the Israeli high tech
sector, evidence shows that a critical ingredient in this process was the quality of the local
labor force.
5.2.6 CONCLUSION
When research data on education and training are combined with anecdotal data from
employers, results show that the quality level of the labor pool in the high tech sector is very
positive in each of our comparison economies. The data also strongly suggest that the quality
of the domestic labor pool was a key factor in the growth of the sector by encouraging
investments in high technology by both multinationals and the indigenous industry. These
similarities between our comparison economies are especially significant given the very
different growth paths each of the software industries has taken.
5 Interview with person 4, a senior faculty member of the HKU computer science department, revealed that, while
the university entrance exam scores of students planning to major in business were in the "A" range, those wanting
to go into computer science were in the "C" range on a scale from A to E, A being best.
5.3 QUALITY LEVEL OF ENGINEERS IN HONG KONG
5.3.1 OVERVIEW
This section tries to assess the quality level of software engineers in the Hong Kong
economy in order to understand if the quality of the labor pool is a key barrier to the growth
of the indigenous software industry. The quality of engineers in Hong Kong was assessed via
interviews with management and human resources personnel in both multinational and
indigenous high-tech firms6 . Results from the interviews show that most high tech firms in
Hong Kong feel that there is a quality issue with locally trained software engineers.
The key skills that most thought were missing were problem solving skills and an ability
to self-learn. Other issues were that students have a very narrow knowledge base (i.e. that
engineering students have very little understanding of the issues beyond the technical ones),
and that they have a very poor communication skills. These issues were not only brought up
in an absolute sense, but also in comparison with engineers who came from abroad. Each of
these issues is discussed in more detail below.
5.3.2 PROBLEM SOLVING AND SELF LEARNING
Of the 11 different software firms interviewed with regards to human resource issues, all of
them commented on either the poor problem-solving skills, the poor self-learning skills, or
both of Hong Kong educated IT engineers. Problem solving and self learning were grouped
together because they both deal with the ability of an engineer to solve a problem in a
relatively unsupervised fashion. These concepts are best explained through the words of those
we interviewed. Person G is an IT Project Manager at Hong Kong Bank, one of the largest
6 See Appendix A at the end of the introductory chapter
recruiters of IT engineers in Hong Kong. He comments that his "Hong Kong people are
very good about gathering data to make a report for me, but it is very difficult for them to
take data, analyze it, and make a decision." Person N agrees with person G, not only in a
absolute sense, but also when comparing Hong Kong educated engineers to those educated
abroad. Future Solutions is a 7-year old company specializing in architectural, engineering,
and construction design software. Person N reports that their new hires are some of the best
from Hong KongU (Hong Kong's oldest and most prestigious university). According to
person N, "we select only people from Hong KongU that have good A-level exam results. We
take people who have strict A's (A's on all their A level exams). We take these people because
programmers need to do meticulous work. People with good academics shows that they are
meticulous in doing work." However, even the best and brightest from Hong KongU seem to
have trouble with problem solving and self-learning skills. Person N continues, "foreign grads
think more before doing. With Hong Kong grads, you give them an order, then they do it.
Foreign grads think about how to solve the problem-they have a problem-solving focus.
Hong Kong grads focus on completing the job. Also, they don't know how to look for help
themselves. They are used to being 'fed' the information they need to do the work."
Apparently, the lack of problem solving and self-learning skills isn't remedied later either.
Person N comments that
Similarly, person P, founder and Managing Director of a young Hong Kong software firm
observed that "we like to hire fresh graduates because you can still teach them." Person P
"we don't like to hire people with experience because it's hard to find people who
have been working in a similar learning environment. Experienced people know
how to do one job. People with 1 or 2 years work experience forget how to think and
learn because of the hierarchical structure of other companies. "
further noted that, "I do find that people from foreign schools learn faster than students
from local universities." The comments from the rest of the 11 software firms we interviewed
were very similar in their concern for the inability of Hong Kong educated IT engineers to
solve problems and self-learn.
5.3.3 NARROW KNOWLEDGE BASE OF FRESH GRADS
Another issue that many companies commented on was the narrow knowledge base of
new graduates. This issue seemed to manifest itself in most cases with employers talking
about the inability of Hong Kong trained engineers to think about using the technology to
meet the needs of the customer. This issue came up especially often when we asked companies
to compare Hong Kong-educated engineers to those engineers educated abroad. Person P says
that "one big problem is that people in Hong Kong aren't trained to develop packaged
software. They don't understand how to take the customer into consideration when
developing software." Person L agrees that "local people in general don't know how to think
about their customers. It's part culture and part the way they are educated." Person D, adds
that "Hong Kong University grads are technically very good, but they have little
understanding of the issues beyond that. For example, to develop a good user interface you
have to understand more than the code, you have to understand what the customers are going
to do." Person O also corroborates the very narrow focus taken by Hong Kong educated
engineers and comments that it could relate to a lack of problem solving skills. According to
person O:
"In terms of problem solving, our Hong Kong IT engineers always try to solve
problems from a computer angle as opposed to a problem solving angle. That is to
say, to solve a problem, you don't always have to change the computer program. It
might be solvable by just communicating with the customer, but the Hong Kong IT
engineers don't take that into account. That's one of the reasons we hire people with
non-computer science backgrounds-we need people who can solve problems."
Concern for the narrow focus of IT engineers went far beyond the people I
interviewed. In their comments in the 25th anniversary edition of the Hong Kong Computer
Society magazine, both Paul Chow, Chairman of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and John
Strickland, former Chairman of Hong Kong Bank, independently commented about how two
few IT professionals have a good grasp of business issues lxxix
One might expect that this narrow knowledge base is confined to fresh IT engineering
graduates. However, person J, Managing Director of a local software firm, and an alumni of
MIT's school of engineering and the Sloan School, says otherwise. According to person J,
when comparing those engineers educated abroad to those educated locally :
5.3.4 DETERIORATING COMMUNICATION SKILLS
Another major skill gap employers repeatedly mentioned was the poor communication
skills of Hong Kong graduates. Specifically, they cited the deterioration of written and spoken
English skills as well as written Chinese skills. Person L was on the Industry Board Advisory
Committee for Computer Science for several universities. One of his main findings was that
the quality of English in the computer science departments of these universities was poor.
Person K, ads that "the problem goes beyond speaking. Hong Kong students can't write
"it's very difficult to find people educated locally who understand the technology as
well as business. We need people who understand what the customer wants and how
to meet his requirements. There is a big vacuum in my company because I do not
have these people. I need fresh graduates with more common sense in understanding
a business man's requirementsfor his industry. Students need a broader knowledge
base. However, even when they're with the company for a few years, they still only
know the basics. Now, in developing new products, we're trying to understand how
the business processes of our potential customers interrelate. Locally trained
employees only focus on certain technical areas and don't understand the
interdependencies between the technical and business sides."
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proper Chinese or English." Person D states that one of the biggest barriers to his
company's growth is its difficulty in finding people in Hong Kong who can travel around the
world to help market his software product. One of the key problems he cites is the poor
language skills. According to person D, "local people don't have an 'international'
understanding. They can't speak English and they can't write Chinese. It's even worse for
people with technical backgrounds."
Faculty in the engineering departments agree that the communication skills of their
students is below par. Person 6 is on the computer science faculty at the Chinese University
of Hong Kong. He finds that the English skills of his students are "poor and getting poorer.
English skills get noticeably worse year by year." Person 9 is a senior professor in electrical
engineering at HKUST. When asked to rate the English skills of his students graduating from
Hong KongUST with a bachelors degree on a scale of "poor, needs improvement, satisfactory,
or good," his response was "needs improvement at best." Person 4, acting head of the
computer science department of a prestigious Hong Kong university, states that "students have
trouble understanding lectures when they first get here." Given that Hong KongU, Hong
KongUST, and Chinese University are considered the most selective universities in Hong
Kong, we can't expect that the situation is any better at Hong Kong's other universities and
technical institutes.
It is interesting to note that, aside from the US, English is not the mother tongue in any of
our other comparison economies. However, engineers in Ireland, Israel, and India are all cited
as having extremely good English skills, a factor which some believe has been important in
contributing to the success of their respective software industries.
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5.3.5 CONCLUSION
As the data show, while employers in our comparison economies rate their engineers
highly, Hong Kong employers feel there are important deficiencies in the skill base of locally
trained engineers. Overall, this is causing high-tech companies in Hong Kong to favor foreign
educated engineers over locally educated ones. The problem is that, compared to locally
educated engineers, foreign educated engineers are in short supply and often much more
expensive. Given that important skill deficiencies appear to be present in the Hong Kong
labor force, the next question is why do those deficiencies exist.
5.4 ARE QUALITY IT ENGINEERS BEING CREATED IN HONG KONG?
5.4.1 OVERVIEW
As described in the previous section, interviews with Hong Kong employers show that
most companies feel that their employees are missing certain vital skills. Returning to the
model in Figure 7, we see that the pool of employees in a given industry is immediately a
function of the industry's ability to attract and retain talent-In essence, the net of the inflows
and outflows of people. However, more fundamentally, the quality level of people in an
industry is a function of the education and training they receive. This section focuses on the
extent to which education and training opportunities in Hong Kong are leading to the skill
deficiencies cited by employers in the previous section. First, in subsection 4.2 we focus on
understanding how the structure of the education system in Hong Kong may be leading to
these skill deficiencies, then consider how work-experience opportunities may also be a factor.
5.4.2 EDUCATION
5.4.2.1 OVERVIEW
Hong Kong's education system follows the British system. Students spend the equivalent
of 5 years in high school, up until Form 7, and then may enter their undergraduate program at
the university. All universities in Hong Kong require three years to get a diploma. There are
some shorter programs offered by some of the universities and by the technical institutes that
offer higher-diploma degrees which are more vocationally oriented. Hong Kong has six full
universities: Hong Kong University (Hong KongU), Chinese University (CU), Hong Kong
University of Science and Technology (Hong KongUST), City University (CityU), The
Polytechnic University of Hong Kong (PolyU), Baptist University (BaptistU), and Ling Nam
University. All except two of the universities, The Polytechnic University of Hong Kong and
Ling Nam, are considered research universities. The ages of the various universities vary
greatly. Hong KongU is about 80-90 years old, CU is about 30 years old, PolyU 20 years,
CityU 10-15 years, Baptist U is 15 years, and Hong KongUST is 5 years. The average school
has about 10,000 students, but Hong KongUST and BaptistU are slightly smaller ixxx.
This subsection will focus primarily on the tertiary education sector. Using primary and
secondary data, I will first examine the quality level of people entering the engineering
departments from the secondary school system. Then, I will look at each of the three skill
deficiencies mentioned earlier, 1) poor problem solving and self learning skills 2) overly
narrow knowledge base and 3) poor communications skills, and try and see if those can be
linked to the way Hong Kong's tertiary sector educates its IT engineers.
5.4.2.2 DO THE BEST HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS CHOOSE ENGINEERING IN COLLEGE?
The first step in assessing why the education system in Hong Kong might not be
producing the necessary skilled graduates is to look at the quality of people choosing to major
in engineering. In Hong Kong, about 10% of the people we interviewed for our research on
the software sector said that the best students don't major in engineering in the first place, but
instead go into business or law7 . Person 4, acting head of the computer science department at a
major Hong Kong university, described the situation at his university in detail:
7 This comment was made by person I; person 6 of Chinese University's computer science department; person 4 of
HKU's computer science department; person G, IT project manager at Hong Kong Bank; person 12, a career
councilor for engineers at Poly University; and person D, managing director of a Hong Kong software company.
"We definitely don't get the best. The statistics department gets the best because
they just opened an actuarial degree program. Their students get A's on all the
subjects of their college entrance exams. Civil engineering is second, their students
average high B low A on their entrance exams. Computer science undergrads
average C's on their entrance exams."
Thus, the quality of the potential IT engineering labor pool is being affected at an even
earlier stage than the model in Figure 7 describes. For some reason, the brightest students in
Hong Kong are not even going into IT engineering. This brings into perspective why person
O, when asked how he deals with the lack of problem solving skills of Hong Kong IT
engineers, commented that he "just gets people with non-computer discipline backgrounds."
The fact that top secondary school students in Hong Kong don't go into IT engineering is in
direct contrast with what we see in a country like India. In fact, many in India are concerned
that, because the brightest students are all going into the software industry, many other
important sectors in the local economy suffering from an "internal brain drain.
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One way to make sense of where the most talented students choose to go is to look at the
success precedents for professionals in a given country. In Hong Kong, the wealthiest people
work in finance, real estate, or trade. In our research, we found very few success precedents in
Hong Kong in high tech. This is in direct contrast to India where software developers can
easily make ten times the average Indian's income, and enjoy a lifestyle which is considered
upper-class. Thus, the first challenge for Hong Kong in addressing the problems of the
software industry may be to find a way to encourage more talented people to enter the
profession.
5.4.2.3 EDUCATION'S EFFECT ON PROBLEM SOLVING AND SELF-LEARNING SKILLS
The most common skill gap mentioned by Hong Kong employers was the deficiency of
problem solving and self learning skills among their engineering employees. Investigation into
how Hong Kong universities educate their engineers suggests three possible explanations: 1)
the focus on rote memorization in universities, 2) the lack of design experience in the
university IT engineering curriculum, and 3) the level of cheating in the IT departments of
universities.
While it is difficult to quantify to what degree the Hong Kong education system focuses on
rote memorization, numerous pieces of anecdotal data suggests it is significant. K.K. Yeung,
Managing Director of HACTL and a former Chairman of the IT Committee of the Industry
and Technology Development Council (ITDC), claimed that "the universities, colleges and
polytechnics tend to churn out robots by spoon-feeding vocational training for Hong Kong's
computer market; but they fail to foster the students' ability to think and reason
independently. " lxxix Person O agrees saying that "it's a big problem that even at the university
level they teach you how to take tests and not to think or do projects. I don't think there is
much hope for universities." This view, that the reason why Hong Kong IT engineers don't
have adequate problem solving or self-learning skills is because of the Hong Kong education
system, was held by many I interviewed. Person P thinks foreign educated engineers are better
problem solvers "because Hong Kong schools teach people how to work and not think." In
fact, 8 of the 11 software companies I interviewed about human resources issues specifically
commented that the lack of problem solving and self learning skills was due to the fact that the
Hong Kong tertiary education sector teaches engineers via rote memorization.
More compelling evidence of the focus on rote memorization in the tertiary IT
engineering curriculum and its impact on students' ability to problem solve and self learn
comes from the students and teachers in Hong Kong themselves. Person H was a lecturer
in computer science at Chinese University for 3 years before going to work full time for the
software company he founded. On the issue of his department's focus on memorization while
he was a lecturer there, he says that:
A group of students who graduated from Hong KongU in the IT engineering disciplines
and who were even teaching assistants for some of the computer science classes add further
evidence that the focus on learning is not just confined to one university. According to these
former students:
However, one might wonder how people "memorize" in an engineering subject. The
Hong KongU students I talked with explain this:
"Universities don't teach problem solving skills. Tests don't require problem solving
skills either because the students wouldn't be able to answer them. . .Students
would score quite badly on my tests because my tests required them to problem
solve. . .The students expect questions to come from the notes. . .[in general]
they're given a lot ofproblems that just require them to regurgitate information."
"Students [in Hong KongU's IT engineering programs] spend a lot of time
memorizing facts because there is too much to learn. Students know ahead of time
what they'll be tested on. Also, they have one exam at the end of the year so there is
less incentive to learn the material as they go along. The typical undergraduates
enjoys 10 months of vacation and 2 months of studying hard. It's a very exam
oriented system, and the exams are geared towards memorization."
"It's not always that they memorize. In teaching a subject, there are two layers-the
conceptual layer and the mechanics layer. Students are very good at grinding
through the math, i.e. doing the mechanics. However, they have very little
understanding of why they are doing what they are doing, i.e. the concepts. "
While most of the discussion on the problem of memorization focused on tertiary
education, the problem seems to go deeper than this. This appears to be an issue that starts in
the primary grades and continues through to the tertiary sector. Clearance Leung, an intern in
the MBHong Kong office, said they are "duck fed" in primary and secondary school. In other
words, they are constantly fed information to memorize. Person O agrees that the problem
starts even before the universities. "In Hong Kong, from primary school through the
universities, you learn to take examinations, not to learn" says person O. Tracy Wong, a
graduate of Harvard who was educated in Hong Kong schools, further supported this. Even
though she went to Harvard, she said she could not keep up with her high school classmates in
Hong Kong who had tremendous "hard drives" for storing information. "They could just store
volumes and volumes of information and then regurgitate it for the test" according to Ms.
Wong. She also commented that the tests, even the college entrance exams, focus on "spitting
back large amounts of information instead of on problem solving." Thus, while we cannot
quantify the degree to which the Hong Kong education system, and especially the IT
engineering curriculum, focuses on rote memorization, anecdotal evidence seems
overwhelmingly to say that it is extensive.
A related problem is the universities' lack of focus on engineering design. Engineering
design courses help to develop problem solving and self learning skills by forcing students to
solve an unstructured problem. Of the seven major universities in Hong Kong, 5 have
engineering departments. I interviewed professors at four of these five universities and, in each
case, the faculty felt that their students were not getting enough design experience in their
curriculum. Professors in IT engineering from Chinese University, Polytechnic University,
Hong Kong University, and Hong KongUST all comment that the students' final year projects
are their only chance to tackle an unstructured design project. Person 1 even casts doubt on
the quality of design experience offered by students' final year projects. Person 1 worked as
a professor for 2 years in Hong KongU's Computer Science department before returning to
the US to join MIT's Laboratory for Computer Science. At MIT, person 1 teaches a
programming languages class and graduate student seminar. He comments that computer
science students in Hong Kong "don't program enough. Three years is not enough time to
learn to be a hacker." He goes on to say that while students "can get good project experience
doing their final year project. . .the typical final year project is junk. Students slack the whole
year and then pull something together in the last month."
Finally, several in academia commented on the extensive cheating that takes place in the
IT engineering disciplines and how it is hindering the development of problem solving skills of
those engineers entering industry. Person H talked about cheating while he was a lecturer in
Chinese University's computer science department. According to Dr. Person H:
Person 1 found similar problems with cheating at Hong KongU as well as at other IT
engineering departments in universities throughout Hong Kong. According to person 1:
"Even projects are a reiteration of the previous year's. This makes it quite easy for
students to copy and not to learn. Plagiarism is also quite rampant. When I was
teaching at CU, I wrote a program that would test to see if two sets of software code
were the same. Using this, in a class of over 100, I found that 20% of the students
had turned in the exact same code for their project. Because of this, they do poorly on
their tests. . . [however] the university never fails anybody. They just shift the
standard."
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" . .students cheat a lot. There is an immense amount of copying in classes at
Hong KongU. My professor buddies at Hong KongUST and CU said the same
thing. The professors don't do anything about it because they are afraid of reprisals
by the parents. Francis Chin, the department head of Hong KongU's computer
science department, said he heard of the parents bringing in lawyers to intimidate
the professor that accused their child of cheating. This really hurts what the students
get out of the class. When I strictly enforced a no cheating rule in my class, students
thanked me for it when the course was over.
When employers in Hong Kong speak of the quality of software engineers they are
getting, every one mentioned the lack of problem solving and self learning skills both in an
absolute sense and relative to those engineers educated abroad. The evidence uncovered
suggest this may, in large part, be due to the way Hong Kong universities are educating
engineers. Anecdotal data from industry and academia almost unanimously point to the fact
that training via rote memorization, especially in the IT engineering curricula, is seriously
impacting engineers' ability to solve engineering problems once they enter the workforce.
The complementary issue to the fact that the IT engineering curricula focuses on
memorization is that there are not enough design opportunities in the curricula-a fact
unanimously agreed to by professors from the four universities I interviewed. Finally, the
whole situation is further worsened by what seems to be serious problems in cheating at many
Hong Kong universities by IT engineering students.
5.4.2.4 THE EDUCATION SYSTEM AND THE NARROW KNOWLEDGE BASE OF FRESH
UNIVERSITY GRADUATES
Findings show that the structure of the tertiary education system seems to be a major
factor contributing to the narrow knowledge base of IT engineers in Hong Kong.
Interviewees repeatedly mentioned that the accreditation process used for the IT engineering
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degrees was at the heart of this problem. The main issue seems to be that the universities
apply an accreditation scheme meant for a 4-year long system to their 3-year long system.
According to person 6 of the Chinese University computer science department:
Academics were not the only ones to point to this issue. The Committee on IT Training
of the Vocational Training Council produced a report that further supports this hypothesis.
In their report, "The 1996 Manpower Survey Report on the Information Technology Sector,"
they recommended that "local educational institutions should also support the industry by
providing a broader curriculum for IT-related degree and sub-degree courses to include
essential business-oriented skills in addition to technical IT skills"'xxxi. However, perhaps the
students in Hong Kong universities describe the situation best. When students at Hong
KongU were asked to comment on the flexibility of taking classes outside their major, they
said that "the engineering disciplines in general are very closed streams." Person E was an IT
major at CityU who graduated in 1995. When asked if he had a chance to take classes outside
of his major, person E responded "No. The major is structured so you can't take any business
classes. There is some flexibility in your senior year, but you only have flexibility in picking
your technical classes. In the 1st and 2nd year, the classes are fixed." In a survey I conducted
on Polytechnic University IT engineering students, 61% said they wanted to take more non-
technical classes. Of those who wanted to take more non-technical classes, 81.8% said they
couldn't do so because they didn't have room in their schedule. Almost identical results came
from a similar survey I conducted at Chinese University. At Chinese U, 59.7% of IT
"we have to squeeze a 4 year curriculum into 3 years. . . . this makes it difficult for
the students to take electives outside of their major and extremely difficult for them
to get a minor in an area not related to their major. This is especially true in the IT
related majors where we have to add classes on new technologies without taking out
the old ones."
--~11111~~~~1~~1~1--~111~~ 1 ~
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engineering students said they wanted to take more non-technical classes and 82.5% of
those said the could not do so because they didn't have enough room in their schedule. Of
those who wanted to take more non-technical classes, over 40% wanted to take more language
classes and almost 20% wanted to take more business classess . It is interesting that the classes
students want to take more of directly correlates with the type of classes employers wish
students could take more of. Namely, classes which will help IT engineering students address
their deficiencies in communicating and in understanding the business issues that go into
creating a technology product.
Many companies complained about the narrow knowledge base of Hong Kong educated
engineers. This problem seems to be explained, at least in part, by the rigidity of most IT
engineering curricula at Hong Kong's various universities. This rigidity seems to come from
the fact that the IT engineering programs are trying to apply an accreditation process meant
for a 4 year university system to their 3 year university system.
5.4.2.5 THE HONG KONG EDUCATION SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON ENGLISH SKILLS
A significant problem that many interviews brought up was the poor English
communication skills of Hong Kong IT engineering graduates. Not only did those
interviewed say the English skills were poor, but they said they were noticeably declining
from year to year. Research seems to indicate that this may be a result of two factors: 1) an
increasing focus on using Cantonese, the "Mother Tongue," to educate students and 2) a
decrease in the admission standards of universities.
8 See Appendix A for a description of the response pool.
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At Hong Kong's most prestigious universities, where English is claimed as the medium
of instruction, a significant portion of instruction actually occurs in Cantonese. According to
students from Hong KongU's IT engineering departments:
Person E, a 1995 IT engineering graduate from City U presents an even dimmer view of
the use of English in instructing university students. According to person E:
While all of Hong Kong's major universities (except Chinese U) claim to use English as
their medium of instruction, in practice the use of Cantonese in various aspects of teaching
seemed to be quite common. Even the students feel they are not getting enough language
training from their university education. My own survey of students indicated that, of those
who want to take more non-technical classes, over 40% of them want to take more language
classes. This was, by far, the area where more students I surveyed wanted to take more non-
technical classes.
Further research indicates that the cause of declining English skills may arise even earlier
than the university experience. In fact, it seems to start at the primary and secondary grade
levels. Person 9 of Hong KongUST said that "when I was in primary school, we were taught
in English. . .however, [today] primary and secondary schooling is increasingly taught in
Cantonese." Person K agrees that "before, most people would go to high schools where most
"Lectures have to be in English, but the tutorials are in Cantonese. This is because
grad students, the ones who teach the tutorials, are more comfortable teaching in
Cantonese. If a professor who speaks Cantonese teaches a recitation, he will teach it
in Cantonese because it will be easier for the students to learn and interact. "
"Most lectures are in English, but not all. If the lecturer is from Hong Kong, then he
will lecture in Cantonese. The professors probably do this because they cannot speak
English that well themselves. Also, all of the tutorials are in Cantonese. "
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of the classes were taught in English. Today, there is a push towards mother tongue
teaching. Everything except the English class is taught in Cantonese." Person K actually
pointed to the fact that it is not that schools are getting lazy about teaching English, but
instead that the government is encouraging them to teach their students using Cantonese.
According to person K, "The Education Department is encouraging mother tongue education
because they think students can learn faster that way."
In 1984, the Education Commission of Hong Kong released its first report, ECR 1. The
report made 13 recommendations with the "most significant" being that "individual secondary
schools should be encouraged to adopt Chinese as the medium of instruction. . ".9
According to the Education commission, this recommendation "was subject to research
findings on the assumption that, all other things being equal, teaching and learning would
generally be more effective if the medium of instruction were the mother tongue. . ." The
result of ECR 1's recommendations was that:
The Education Commission's 4th report (ECR 4) went further in making
recommendations on the medium of instruction at the primary education level. The
Education Comission's Working Group concluded that:
9 In the Education Commission reports, Chinese refers to Cantonese and Putonghua refers to Mandarin
"since September 1989, all government and aided secondary schools with 18 classes
or more have been provided with an additional graduate teacher of Chinese. Of the
361 government, aided and caput secondary schools, 126 have adopted Chinese
either fully or partly as their medium of instruction. 38 schools will soon follow
suit. A further 120 schools are considering the issue. Since September 1986, teacher
training courses have been modified to train teachers for a wider use of
Chinese. 'ixxxii
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"given Hong Kong's situation, the use of Chinese as a medium of instruction in
primary schools should be strengthened. It also concluded that the time spent on
English should not be increased since it was unlikely that this would lead to higher
standards and might indeed result in a distortion of the primary curriculum. ,xxxii
While another significant recommendation of ECR 1's recommendations in 1984 was to
"improve the standard of English teachers and to strengthen the teaching of English in
secondary schools," our interviews in 1996 suggested that this had not in practice been
sufficient to counterbalance the effects of the push to mother tongue education.
Another factor that many interviewees mentioned as a potential cause of the perceived
decline in the English skills of Hong Kong university graduates was the fact that the
universities have become easier to get into. In 1989, the Hong Kong government announced
its intention to increase the number of university students from 5% of the population of
university age people to 18% over a 5 year period. In order to fill the seats in the newly
expanded tertiary sector, the government had to lower the standards for university entrance.
In fact, interviews at Hong KongUST, Poly U, City U, and Chinese U all indicated that
English skills have worsened, in part, because college admissions standards have gone down.
5.4.3 WORK EXPERIENCE OPPORTUNITIES
In explaining why IT engineering students graduating from Hong Kong's tertiary
education sector are missing skills, one must look at the professional training opportunities
they are exposed to in addition to their academic experience. In section 3 of this chapter, we
identified three main issues concerning the quality of Hong Kong trained engineers: 1) lack of
problem solving/self learning skills 2) lack of a broad knowledge base and 3) poor
~ _______I~~.~~..............I~........~~~
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communication skills. My research suggests that the low quality and quantity of work
experience for IT engineers in Hong Kong may be contributing to the first two problems.
Data from Hong KongU's summer job placement program shows that work assignments
help students to develop their self-learning skills. Hong KongU places engineers in companies
during their second summer in order to help them gain work experience. When students who
returned from the work assignment were asked which skills have they improved through the
experience, 74% chose "self-learning" skills. To put this in perspective, the second most
frequently chosen answer was "human relations" skills with 58% of students selecting itlxxxiii.
Most Hong Kong IT engineering students don't get meaningful work experience
opportunities. One major factor seems to center around how the summers are utilized. Many
IT engineers are required to spend one or both of their summers in "simulated industrial
training." Simulated industrial training is essentially a lab class during the summer. One of
the biggest centers for simulated industrial training is located at PolyU and is called the
Industrial Center (IC). According to the IT engineering career counselor at CityU, person 12,
3 of the 5 IT engineering degree programs at CityU require students to spend 10-12 weeks out
of both of their summer vacations in the IC. Electrical Engineers at Poly U also attend the IC
for between 4 and 6 weeks of each of their two summers, and Hong KongUST had sent its IT
engineers to the IC during the past. Hong KongUST has now created its own industrial
training program called the Industrial Training Center (ITC). Hong KongU's University
Industrial Center (UIC) provides in-house training during the students' first summer. The
training is composed of a series of workshops at the university that last between 4 and 10
weeks depending on the major. Thus, as we can see, a significant number of IT engineers in
Hong Kong are not utilizing their summers to get the real-world work experience-an
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experience that those doing company internships at Hong KongU felt contributed greatly
to their self-learning skills.
Beyond the fact that simulated industrial training prevents students from getting work
experience during their summers, the quality of the simulated industrial experience is
questionable. Person 12 commented that IT engineers from CityU felt the IC training was
"too technician oriented-very low level junior technician oriented. Not the type of work
professionals would do." Person 9 of Hong KongUST further confirmed this sentiment. He
commented that "The feedback we got about the IC from our students was terrible. They
called it useless, with terrible instruction and instructors. The modules they had for electrical
engineers included plating, machining parts, and plastic molding." Because of this, Hong
KongUST stopped using Poly U's IC, but they could not eliminate simulated industrial
training from the curriculum all together. According to person 9:
The result was that Hong KongUST created its own simulated industrial training program
called the ITC. However, even Hong KongUST's improved simulated industrial training
program casts doubt on whether such programs will give students the problem solving and
self-learning skills asked for by industry. Hong KongUST's ITC will give students "product
oriented training. Like how to be a UNIX system administrator. For example, we get SUN's
UNIX administrator training program and modify it to include more exercises and some
exams" says person 9. However, person 9 does give some insight as to why Hong KongUST,
"now, it's hard to get a program accredited if it doesn't have such a component.
Chinese University wanted to get rid of it all together, but had to settlefor reducing
the amount of time students spent in it. Simulated industrial training, whether we
provide it or whether PolyU provides it is a thing of the past. However, the Hong
KonglE (the Hong Kong equivalent of ABA T) is even more short-sighted than
ABA T Accreditation organizations are bean counters, not visionaries."
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the most prestigious technical institution in Hong Kong, is providing vocational style
training to its engineers. Person 9 comments that "the difficulty is that there is not a job
market for design engineers. The demand is for system administrators and IT administrators,
both of which pay more than design engineers."
Another option that universities offer to students to help them get professional experience
before they graduate is called the "sandwich" program. This program "sandwiches" a year of
company internship experience between the 2nd and 3rd years of a student's schooling.
However, interviews showed that students' interest in sandwich programs were very low at all
the universities in Hong Kong. Person 13 of Hong KongU best conveys the reasons described
by many for the low popularity among students of the sandwich programs:
For those IT engineering students who are not in the sandwich programs and who are not
required to do simulated industrial center training during their summers, the learning quality
of their summer experiences is also questionable. Person 1, a former faculty member in
Computer Science at Hong KongU, expressed deep concern for the types of work experience
even his best students were able to get. According to person 1:
"Last year we had 7 students and this year we have 8 students in the sandwich
program, however when the program was first introduced there were twenty
students participating. We attribute this decrease in participation to several reasons-
-all of which revolve around the fact that the student must spend an extra year in
college. First, because of the political uncertainty attributed to 1997, students want
to finish with college as early as possible. Second, because of the delayed graduation,
they enter companies a year later than their peers. Thus, a person who was once
their peer in college is now in a relatively more senior position in the company since
they have been there a year longer. That means they are first to get promoted to
higher profile positions within that company."
107
"the jobs they get are terrible and offer little educational experience. Even the
good students that want to be hackers can't get a decent job. They don't get any
network protocol or C programming experience. There should be a program created
to allow good students to find good jobs."
Person 1's IT engineering students at Hong KongU confirm that, in general, students in
their department typically get little or no quality work experience during the summer.
According to Person 1's students, computer science students at Hong KongU "might do
freelance programmer jobs in small companies or vacation in Europe or China. They really
don't get quality summer jobs because employers don't like hiring people for the summer."
My trip to the Hong KongUST career office further confirmed the dearth of quality technical
summer jobs available to students. In their summer job bulletin, only a few technical
companies posted summer and part-time jobs. However, not one of the postings by the
technical companies were for a technical position. They were all for very low level marketing
and promotion type positions. Person 6 of the Chinese U computer science department agrees
that "the problem is that [IT engineering] students work in marketing and sales during their
summers." Overall, we heard few stories that IT engineers were participating in quality
summer work assignments.
One reason for the lack of quality summer opportunities may stem from the hiring
practices of Hong Kong's software companies themselves. Of the seven companies we talked
to about summer hiring practices, six of them commented that they don't have formal summer
internship programs because they don't think students could be productive during the 3
month long summer. When they do hire summer students, they typically do so because it is
the child of one of their customers or partners. The issue of summer hiring practices by Hong
Kong software companies will be discussed further in the next section. However it seems that
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there is an opportunity for industry to do more to give students experience that may help
to address, at least in a small way, the skill deficiencies that employers are most concerned
about.
5.4.4 CONCLUSION
This section looked at how the Hong Kong education system and training opportunities
could potentially be at the heart of the missing skills of IT engineers that Hong Kong software
firms commented so frequently about. The research shows that both the education system and
training opportunities are probably playing a role in creating the skill gaps cited. Strong
evidence was found which connects the deficiencies cited by employers in all three areas, 1)
problem solving and self learning 2) narrow knowledge base and 3) poor communication skills,
with particular structural issues in the Hong Kong education system. Strong evidence was also
found which would connect deficiencies in the quality and quantity of training opportunities
with deficiencies 1) and 2) above.
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5.5 ARE QUALITY PEOPLE BEING ATTRACTED AND RETAINED BY HONG
KONG'S INDIGENOUS SOFTWARE INDUSTRY
5.5.1 OVERVIEW
While findings in the previous section showed that the way engineers are being educated
and trained may be at the very root of the problems causing the concern by employers in the
quality of the labor force, other issues may also be involved. Data shows that software firms
are having a very difficult time attracting and retaining engineering talent. This section breaks
the problem down into two parts. First, the ability of software firms to attract engineering
talent and, second, their abilities to retain it.
5.5.2 THE ABILITY OF LOCAL SOFTWARE FIRMS TO ATTRACT ENGINEERING TALENT
Many local software firms in Hong Kong complain that it is very hard for them to find
engineers, good or otherwise. This could be because there is a 12% shortage of IT personnel in
the industry, and because average corporate MIS salaries average almost 19% higher than those
of the average ISV""'xxxi . However, Hong Kong's local software firms also attribute their
problem recruiting to the attitudes of these locally trained engineers, which they say focuses
on getting big salaries and big titles. Person O is Managing Director of large Hong Kong
software company which makes software for the financial services industry. The company is
20 years old is one of the few software firms in Hong Kong generating enough revenue to
make it eligible to list on the HKSE. In terms of recruiting, person O says "we're one of the
companies that has better access to universities because I know some of the university
professors." However, when asked to describe the effectiveness of his recruiting program,
person O was not positive:
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"The job seekers don't want to take the time to send in a resume so I have them
call in, but the response is not good. We (ABC Data) don't think about getting the
best students, they wouldn't stay with us anyway. When you're hungry, you don't
complain about the quality of the food you're getting."
This has led person O to seek other sources of talent such as the Vocational Training
Council's retraining program, which retrains people with non-engineering degrees to be
software developers. However, according to person O, "the problem is that the people that
replied sent in resumes that had job objectives like "manager" and not "programmer." They
don't want to do what they've been trained for." Person H, founder of young Hong Kong
software company, is even more direct about the attitude he finds among locally trained
engineers. "Students are too materialistic-they don't look at the opportunity for personal
growth," according to person H. Person J, managing director of a local software firm, furthers
the view that monetary compensation is a key driving factor in being able to attract talented
people. According to person J, "The top students go to top companies. The government gets
good students, Hong Kong Bank gets the best student." According to salary surveys from the
various university career centers, the jobs with the Hong Kong government consistently offer
some of the highest entry level salaries for new graduates. Banks on the other hand offer
attractive perks like low interest home loans. Person M also agrees that Hong Kong engineers
"need to be more concerned with their professional growth than their pocket growth. People
in Hong Kong just focus on money." In all, 5 of the 11 software companies interviewed
commented that the desire for high salaries and quick promotions made it difficult for
indigenous software companies, typically smaller companies, to recruit IT engineers 1 .
10 This includes the companies mentioned above plus TA Consultants.
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Yet, the reasons why companies say students do not accept jobs with them are
completely different from what students themselves say about why they do or do not accept
job offers. The table below lists why students from different Hong Kong universities decided
to take the jobs they did after graduation. The table lists the top 3 decision criteria. When the
issues that employers think are important criteria to Hong Kong IT engineers (i.e. "high
salary," "company status," or "prospects for promotion") are not among the top 3, the table
also shows where students ranked those issues as well.
R Criteria (multiple criteria R Criteria (only a single R Criteria
a can be chosen) a criteria can be chosen) a
n n n
k k k
1 62.5% Relevant to study 1 17% Good training and 1 Interesting/Challenging
learning opportunity work
2 47.5% Interesting job 2 15.9% Relevant to course 2 Training/Learning
nature of study Opportunities
3 37.2% Matching career 3 13.5% Interesting & 3 Promotion Prospects
goals meaningful job nature
5 29.5% Attractive terms of 4 13.3% Attractive terms 4 Terms of Employment
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employment of employment
8 10.3% Status 9 4.2% Good promotion 9 Name/Prestige of the
prospects Company
9 8% favorable promotion 1 2.5% high status
prospects 0
Table 8: Job decision criteria of Hong Kong university graduates
As can be seen from the table above, important criteria in choosing a job seem to be that
the job is interesting and that it offers a chance to learn. This is further supported by data I
gathered from a survey of IT engineers at Chinese University that found a high correlation
between whether or not their previous summer job offered a learning experience and whether
or not they were satisfied with the experience. On the other hand, the table also shows that
issues such as compensation, opportunities for promotion, and status-the ones employers
believe are important to new graduates-are actually ranked relatively low. The remarkable
similarity of these results across very different universities lends support to their accuracy.
How can we explain these difference between why employers say they are having
difficulty recruiting IT engineers and why students are taking the jobs that they are? To better
understand the situation, it is important to understand the process students go through when
deciding which job to pick. In this regard, we can apply a concept from marketing theory
called the Hierarchy of Effects Model. This model defines a series of "steps" consumers
typically go through when make a decision to adopt a given product. In this case, the
"product" is a job with a local Hong Kong software company. The model has six distinct
steps:
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1. Awareness
2. Interest
3. Evaluation
An individual must tirst be made
aware that the given product does
exist
An individual must have an interest
in the product after being made aware
of it if that individual is to proceed to
adoption.
An individual must have some way to
evaluate the attributes of the product.
Company A comes to campus to give
a presentation to graduating seniors
and potential summer interns. The
presentation describes the company,
the industry the company is in, and
the roles the company has for the
different students.
A student finds company A's
presentation interesting and wants to
find out more about jobs with the
company, and how those jobs
compare with other companies the
student is interested in.
The student talks to friends who
worked at company A or who know
people who worked at the company
to find out more about the type of
work experience it offers. Also, the
student can look at stock analyst
reports to find out how successful
company A has been. The student is
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4. Preference
5. Trial
6. Adoption
An individual then must decide
which product seems most preferable
from a given product category.
An individual who has a positive,
low-risk, first-hand experience with
the product will be more likely to
adopt the given product
An individual makes the decision to
adopt the product.
Table 9: Hierarchy of Effects Model
Using this model for product adoption from consumer marketing theory, we can now ask:
"are Hong Kong software companies doing a good job of marketing themselves to prospective
job candidates?"
Generating awareness about a product is the first step in getting someone to adopt it.
Similarly, it is the first step in getting someone to think about choosing a job in a particular
industry or with a particular company. Generating awareness is also something that occurs on
able to compare company A against
other companies the student is
interested in.
Company A has been rated highly by
the different sources consulted by the
student and the students decides
company A would be the best to
work for.
Ideally, the student would have a low-
risk/low-commitment opportunity to
see what working at company A is
like-like a summer internship.
The student makes a decision based
on the information from either step 4
or step 5 to work for company A.
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several different levels. When getting someone to choose a particular job, at the most
basic level that person must be aware that a particular industry exists. Then, they must be
aware of the particular companies in that industry, and finally they must be aware of the
particular jobs with the different companies.
In Hong Kong, the problem may very well start with the fact that many coming out of
college don't know that an indigenous software industry even exists. When questioning
Person l's former computer science students from Hong KongU about the Hong Kong
software industry, their response was "It's funny that you say "software industry." That's the
first time we've heard those words used in connection with Hong Kong." According to
person 1, these were some of the most serious computer science students at Hong KongU, and
the fact that they were unaware of a domestic industry makes one wonder just how aware
others are.
Further study was done of how aware other IT engineering students in Hong Kong are
about the local software industry and about the firms that compose it. The survey I conducted
presented seven local software companies including ABC Data, Magic, Integrated Solutions,
TA Consultants, Prima Design Systems, Future Solutions, and Turbo Soft. Students were
then asked to rate their awareness of the company by putting a check mark in the appropriate
place on the scale. The scale was composed of qualitative categories including "Never Heard
About Them," "Heard Something, but Not Much," "Familiar With Them," and "Very
Familiar With Them." I used a relatively generous criterion to determine whether or not a
student was "aware" of the indigenous software industry. If the student had at least "heard
something, but not much" about two companies of the seven, they were considered "aware."
The surveys done at Chinese U and Poly U revealed remarkably similar results. 22.2% of IT
engineering students at Poly U and 22.4% of IT engineering students at Chinese U were
116
"aware" of indigenous companies in the Hong Kong software industry. What makes the
similarity of these numbers from these two different schools even more interesting is the
difference in the age demographics of the people who responded from the two universities. At
Poly U, 20% of the respondents were first year students while 70% were 2nd year students. At
Chinese U, 20.9% of respondents were 2nd year students and 76% were 3rd year students. This
could imply a few things. First, it seems that students don't become "more aware" of the
indigenous software industry as they go through college. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, in a survey in which 76% of respondents were final term, final year IT
engineering students who were getting ready to enter industry, only about 1 in 5 was aware of
the local software industry.
This naturally leads to the question of how the local software industry tries to generate
awareness. While all software companies weren't asked specifically about how they recruit, 4
of the 11 software companies interviewed commented that their primary method of recruiting
was to place an ad in the South China Morning Post (SCMP) newspaper. This corresponds
well with channels students use to find jobs. According to career office surveys, students from
all the major universities use the South China Morning Post as their primary source of job
information, even more than their own university career office. However, given the low level
of awareness of these companies by students as indicated by the survey, it is clear that
advertisements in the SCMP have not been an effective method of generating awareness. The
interesting issue is that companies that have bigger reputations to start with, like Hong Kong
Bank or Motorola, actually do more to generate awareness on college campuses then the less
well known software companies in Hong Kong. Mr. Dennis Lo, the recruiting manager at
Motorola, states that his company has "strong ties and student programs with virtually every
local university." Person G of Hong Kong Bank's IT department states that they "get almost
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100% of [their] people out of colleges." They get these people by going "to give talks
during the recruiting days at the campuses-about 2 times per year." Person G, the results of
their recruiting programs are very strong. "One year, we were looking to get 100 fresh grads
and we got 500 responses," says person G. This is despite the fact that they only use the
SCMP to get experienced hires who have skills that are hard to develop in-house.
The key issue is that even the most famous companies have to spend significant amounts
of time generating awareness about themselves and the jobs they offer in order to get the best
people. This is true not only in Hong Kong but also in the US. Companies like Cisco
Systems and Microsoft believe their success hinges on getting the best people in the industry.
Even though they both have tremendous reputations in the computer industry, they both
spend a significant amount of time trying to generate awareness about the types of positions
they offer. Cisco Systems developed the Cisco Friends program to make potential candidates
aware of the types of jobs Cisco offers and the work environment it provides. This program
pairs current Cisco employees who are in a given job function with potential Cisco employees
who may be recruited into a similar job function. Using the framework of the Hierarchy of
Effects Model, this allows Cisco to generate awareness, cultivate interest, and help the
candidate to evaluate the job in a way that requires very little risk on the side of the potential
employee. Furthermore, companies like Cisco and Microsoft assume that the best people are
not looking for jobs because good people are probably treated very well by their current
employer. However, both Cisco and Microsoft make aggressive efforts to generate awareness
among top talent at other companies. According to Mr. David Pritchard, Microsoft's director
of recruiting, they "will get an org chart and start calling" in order to make top talent in other
companies aware of job opportunities with Microsoftiv. One might expect that only big
companies like Microsft or Cisco have the resources to be aggressive at generating awareness.
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However, evidence suggests that companies of all sizes looking for top talent on campuses
are aggressive at generating awareness. In the US, medium size software companies like
Trilogy or Microstrategy may visit a given campus three or four times a year. They also have
their CEO or other top executives come to campuses to talk about issues of interest to
students such as emerging technologies, trends in the industry, or how to start a high-tech
company. They do this all for the sake of generating awareness about their company among
potential employees. Even software startups are active in trying to generate awareness on
campuses where they expect to find top talent. During the 1998 spring semester at MIT (from
January through early May), over 30 software start-ups sent e-mail to electrical engineering and
computer science mailing list in order to attract potential employees. There were also many
that came on-campus to recruit students.
Besides being more active on campus in recruiting full-time employees, another tactic that
was found to be underutilized by all software firms interviewed in Hong Kong was that of
having an active summer recruitment program. An active summer recruitment program
impacts many important parts of the Hierarchy of Effects Model. It generates awareness and
interest in the company, and it creates a opportunity for students evaluate and try out the jobs
at the company with minimal commitment. It also allows the company to scout for top
talent, get relatively inexpensive summer labor, and test out potential full-time hires with
much less risk. However, none of the indigenous software companies interviewed had an
active summer recruitment program. If they did take any summer students, firms mentioned
they took them because the intern was related to customers or partners of the company. One
might expect that these firms don't have an active summer program is because they are small
and don't have as much need for manpower. However, according to Motorola's recruitment
manager, Dennis Lo, "for other companies to initiate these kind of [summer and co-op]
119
programs [like Motorola's] with universities is not a matter of company size, but a matter
of company desire." The most frequently mentioned reason for not having an active summer
recruitment program was that companies felt that students could not be productive during the
summer. This reason was mentioned by six of the eleven software companies interviewed.
This seems to point out that local software companies are taking a very short term view with
their human resources strategy. They are looking at a summer intern program as something
which should produce an immediate return on investment as opposed to seeing it as a strategy
which could increase likelihood of top students taking jobs with them after graduation.
Indigenous software companies repeatedly talk about the difficulty of getting talented
students to chose a job with them as opposed to a job with a multinational or the IT
department of a bank. These local software companies complain that good students choose
the jobs with the larger companies because students are "money-oriented" or because they
want quick promotions. However, when students are asked why they took the job they did,
they give very different explanations. They say they are looking for learning opportunities
and interesting jobs. The Hierarchy of Effects Model was used to understand how students go
about choosing a job. The model suggests that local software companies spend their time
focusing on the very last step of the model-the adoption phase. Their argument is that "top
students adopt top companies." However, if we look at the process which students must go
through when deciding which company to adopt, we find that local software companies lose
out for the most fundamental reason of all-students don't know about them.
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5.5.3 THE ABILITY OF LOCAL SOFTWARE FIRMS TO RETAIN ENGINEERING
TALENT
While the ability of a firm to attract a talented employee is one thing, keeping that
employee is another. This section seeks to understand the impact of employee turnover on
Hong Kong software firms and how that level of turnover can be better managed.
According to the 1996 Manpower Survey of the IT industry, of nine different industrial
sectors, software vendors had the highest level of turnover of IT people, at 30.1% of their IT
staff. In comparison, the finance sector was the third lowest with 16%. In one year, there was
close to 45% turnover of applications programmers and 40% turnover of R&D people in the
software vendor sector. In the 2 5th anniversary yearbook produced by the Hong Kong
Computer Society, both Paul Chow, the CEO of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and John
Strickland, former chairman of the Hong Kong Bank, independently criticized the high
turnover rate in Hong Kong's IT profession. According to Mr. Strickland "Too many job-
hoppers looking for short term rewards makes it difficult to have trust in hiring local
companies for large IT projects. It also makes it difficult to make Hong Kong a development
base.""xix A survey of human resource professionals confirms that turnover is the number one
problem they facelxxxv. To put the percentages above in perspective, average labor turnover for
all of Hong Kong is 18%. In East Asia, this is second only to Thailand which has 20%
turnover. The lowest turnover rate in East Asia is in Japan with 9% xxxvi. Silicon Valley,
known as a hot bed for job-hoppers, has an average turnover rate of 16%xxxv1i. Thus, as the
numbers show, both in an absolute sense and a relative sense, turnover of software developers
in Hong Kong software companies is extremely high on average.
There are many potential causes of this high turnover. However, one clue as to why
engineers are so dissatisfied on average when working for local software vendors may be found
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in the data describing why people pick jobs in the first place. The data from the career
offices of various local universities describing the key criteria students used to make their job
decision points to the importance of learning opportunities and the importance of the job
being interesting. In terms of learning opportunities, the data suggests that software companies
might not be training their employees as much as other sectors who utilized IT personnel. The
same 1996 manpower study mentioned above shows that, in terms of providing IT training
courses to its IT employees, software vendors have the lowest percentage of companies
offering various types of formal training. For the software vendors sector, the maximum
percentage for a given type of formal training is 68% whereas the second lowest is 73% in
transport storage and communication. On average, in 1995, while software vendors trained
31.6% of their employees, finance companies trained 41%. xi . The reasons they give for this
low level of training are simple. Software vendors were the second most likely sector, behind
the restaurant and hotel sector, to say that they don't train people because they don't have a
budget for it. However, of these 9 sectors, they were only the 5th most likely to say that they
didn't offer training because they already saw their employees as well trained. Thus, one
potential issue that the data shows is that, while IT engineers value training, Hong Kong
software companies typically do not have the financial resources to provide that training.
The reason why many indigenous Hong Kong software companies believe turnover is so
high is because they believe their employees are looking for more financial benefits or bigger
titles at bigger organizations like the IT department of a bank. Three of the larger software
companies in Hong Kong that we interviewed, ABC Data, WOCS, and ISL all brought up this
issue. According to person J, "After several years, our employees jump to the banks so they
can get these [low interest housing] loans." Person O feels similar pressure from the banks,
especially since his programmers work so closely with them already. According to person O,
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"After 2 years of getting experience with us, [my employees] can get a big jump in salary if
they go to our customers [the banks]. . .[Hong Kong people] want to get bigger titles and
more money"
Another reason for the high turnover could be the lack of financial incentives available to
the indigenous firms. When we look at the US to understand how firms help control
turnover, one mechanism that has taken on greater importance recently is the use of restricted
stock option grants. The value of shares set aside for options grants in the US was about $59
billion in 1985 and by 1996 the figure was about $600 billion. Currently, 90% of public US
companies have stock option programsl xxviii. While some might believe this high percentage
could be misleading given that many companies grant options only to executives, a study done
of 197 companies in the manufacturing, utilities, finance, and trade sectors show that 88% of
companies extend options eligibility down through middle management""ix. In a study of
why companies grant stock options, the number one reason cited was said to be "retention of
employees. "  Options act as "golden handcuffs" in retaining employees because of the
restrictions typically placed on them. For example, 86% of US companies had an exercise
period of 10 years and 70% had a waiting period of 1 year'"'x . Small high-tech firms especially
find the use of restricted option grants as important in helping them retain key talent. One
study on high tech firms that recently did an IPO found that the second biggest advantage of
going public described by the sample companies was the ability to create employee incentive
plans which help retain talent. According to the study "going public clearly demonstrates the
potential value of the company to employees and creates liquidity for their equity. These
types of incentive plans are hard to implement if the company is private." ''
Unfortunately, for many indigenous firms in Hong Kong's software industry, giving
equity doesn't seem to have the same retention effects. One major reason for this is that going
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public is difficult for many software companies given the current listing regulations on the
Hong KongSE (see chapter on capital markets for more detail). Person O tried to offer equity
as means of retaining people when his company was far from being able to meet the Hong
KongSE listing requirements. However, when ABC Data "tried to offer shares in 1985. . .it
was a disaster," according to person O. "The company had no possibility of being listed at
that time, so equity in the company didn't mean anything to the employees." Thus, without
the ability to create "golden handcuffs," one might expect that reducing turnover in Hong
Kong's software industry will be difficult.
There are several possible explanations for why turnover is so high in local software firms.
We found that the indigenous software industry can't invest as much in formal training as
some of the other sectors which it competes with for IT manpower, and we found that the
"golden handcuffs" so effectively employed by many firms in the US is not an option for the
typical Hong Kong software company. Finally, many in the local software industry believe
people just go to a small software companies to get some experience so that they can get a
better paying job at the IT department of a bank. One way to gain insight into which of tehse
factors is most important is to look at high-tech firms in Hong Kong with low turnover rates
and try to understand if they have anything in common. Six high-tech companies in Hong
Kong were interviewed whose employee turnover ranged from "virtually no turnover" to
about 10%. The companies include Motorola, Johnson Electric, Wong's Circuits, Goldpeak
China, Prima Design Systems, and Future Solutions. The reason mentioned by all six
companies as to why turnover was low was the effort they put into helping their employees to
develop professionally. According to person D, "I provide lots of training. .I have people
come in and lecture on special subjects. . .[and] I send people to universities." Person N
comments that "we don't have trouble keeping people because they learn a lot with us. We've
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had people that have been with us for 5 to 6 years." Of all the companies interviewed by
the MBHong Kong team which have plants both in Hong Kong and China, only one,
Goldpeak, had lower turnover in China than in Hong Kong. Goldpeak's statistics show
14.29% turnover among engineers in Hong Kong while only 7.2% turnover among engineers
in the PRC. When looking at the different human resource practices in Goldpeak China
versus Goldpeak Hong Kong, we found that Goldpeak China has a well-defined training
program in Shenzhen called the "Clipsal China Apprentice Training Center" which is a
program jointly offered with Shenzhen University. However, no such training program
exists in Hong Kong.
While all six companies pointed to the effort they put into professional development of
their staff as a major factor contributing to their low turnover, only 2 of the 6 made reference
to financial incentives as another factor. Johnson Electric mentioned that it gives low-rate
housing loans and other financial incentives for people who stay with the company a long
time, and Prima Design commented that they give people equity and profit sharing. However,
financial incentives as a reason for low turnover were not mentioned at all by the other 4
companies.
The six companies that have such low turnover can provide an important lesson to Hong
Kong software companies. The lesson is that people will stay with your company if they feel
you are playing an important role in their development. This is not only supported by the
anecdotal evidence of the six companies above, it is also supported by what Hong Kong college
students say are the most important criteria for choosing a job.
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5.5.4 CONCLUSION
This section looked at two major influences on the quality level of people in Hong Kong
firms; first, the ability of the firm to attract quality people, and second, the ability of the firm
to retain them. In terms of being able to attract quality people, the Hierarchy of Effects Model
presented a series of steps someone must go through before "adopting" a job. Data show that
students are probably not looking at working for indigenous software companies for the most
fundamental reason of all-they don't know about them. In terms of retaining people, local
software companies were found to have extremely high turnover rates by any standard. While
many in the local industry say that people leave in order to get more money or bigger titles,
anecdotal data from firms with very low turnover seem to show that the most important
factor is investing in the development of employees.
5.6 CONCLUSION
Quality people are of tremendous importance to the growth of a software industry. Data
from a recent survey of MIT related software companies describes it well. The most important
reason by far for contact with universities by these software companies, above faculty
consulting, doing joint R&D, and other potential reasons for contact was the need to do
recruiting. The most important determinant for a software company to locate where it did
was because of access to skilled professionals. Besides the limitations provided by the capacity
of the present location of the company, access to skilled professionals was the most important
factor affecting a software company's expansion.
Because of the vital importance of people in driving software companies, this chapter took
an extensive look at the ways in which human resources issues could potentially be affecting
Hong Kong's indigenous software industry. A model was proposed in order to provide a
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framework for understanding the importance of the quality level of people in the software
industry in driving its growth, and the different ways in which that quality can be affected.
Secondary data collected on the US, Israel, India, and Ireland suggest that the successful firms
in these economies consider the quality level of local people to be very important to their
success. Thus, not only did quality seem to be present in the labor pool for high-tech in our
comparison economies, but that quality level was cited as an important driver of growth.
The next step was to understand the quality level of IT engineers in Hong Kong firms, and
the key factors that could be affecting that level of quality. Consensus from the interviews
showed that domestic software companies were not happy with the quality of engineers they
were getting. Fundamentally, this quality was found to be affected by problems in the way IT
engineers are educated and trained. The quality level of IT engineers working in Hong Kong's
indigenous software sector is further impacted by the difficulties that sector has in attracting
and retaining quality engineers.
What this overall analysis tell us is that quality people are fundamental to driving the
growth of a software industry. There are no examples of a successful software industry in
which the quality of people is not rated highly by some third party. This result has important
implications for Hong Kong's long term priorities if it wants to build a competitive software
industry
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY INFORMATION
The survey taken at Polytechnic University had the following statistics:
36 respondents all of whom are IT majors. The survey was handed out during classes and,
according to the faculty who handed them out, the response rate was near 100%.
The breakdown by year is as follows:
20.% 1" year students
75% 2nd year students
5% 3 rd year students
The survey taken at Chinese University had the following statistics:
67 respondents all of whom are IT majors. The survey was handed out during classes and,
according to the faculty who handed them out, the response rate was near 100%.
The breakdown by year is as follows:
0% 1" year students
21% 2nd year students
79% 3rd year students
128
6. SOURCE
ORGANIZATIONS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The term "source organization" has been used by Prof. Edward Roberts of the MIT Sloan
School to refer to an organization which provides the technological base for a start-up
companyxciii. This base may be provided through the physical transfer of technology or simply
through the specialized training that the founder of the start-up gets while at the source
organization. My definition of a "source organization," is slightly broader than that of
Roberts. I define a source organization as one which provides the technological and the
managerial base for a start-up. This expanded definition reflects the importance of sound
management as well as sound technology in creating a successful new venture.
This chapter takes a closer look at the role source organizations play in helping to create
an industry. Specifically, I look at two main types of source organizations, universities and
large companies, and try to understand their impact in providing the technological and
managerial base for new companies in the software industry. I then look at the Hong Kong
economy to understand how their presence (or lack thereof) my be a factor in affecting the
growth of Hong Kong's indigenous software industry.
This chapter is divided into four main sections. Section 2 presents an overview of the
theory of source organizations developed by Roberts. While focusing mainly on the issue of
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technology, this section characterizes source organizations and presents conditions which
promote or inhibit the transfer of technology from the source organization to the start-up.
Section 3 examines the role universities have played in high-tech industry formation both in
the US and in our other comparison economies, and then compares this with the role
universities are playing in Hong Kong. Section 4 looks at the other major category of source
organizations, large high-tech companies. While the chapter on universities mainly focuses on
their role as a technological source organization, section 4 considers the role of large
companies in helping to form both the technological and managerial base of new enterprises.
Section 5 concludes by comparing the role of source organizations with the other macro-
variables looked at elsewhere in this thesis.
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6.2 OVERVIEW OF THE THEORY
The research conducted by Roberts provides a solid basis for understanding the link
between source organizations and the formation of new enterprises, especially in the high-tech
sector xcii. Roberts' work finds that source organizations are important because they provide a
low risk opportunity for potential entrepreneurs to learn about problems and how they can be
solved with particular technologies or skills. For example, of 125 companies started by MIT
affiliated people, only 13% had no technical dependence whatsoever on the MIT lab where
their founders had gained experience. Roberts' research finds that large high-tech corporations
also play an important role in acting as the source of the technological base of new enterprises.
Evidence from one major electronics manufacturer showed that 40% of the companies that
were started by its former employees used technology which either "directly" or "partially"
came from the electronics manufacturer". The results Roberts' collected from a large
diversified technology company presented even greater evidence. In this case, 48% of the new
companies started by the diversified technology company's former employees were "direct"
spin-offs while a further 17% were "partial" spin-offs. Roberts' study of Route 128 firms was
paralleled by a study of Silicon Valley firms. In 1984, a survey showed that 75% of 182 Silicon
Valley firms' founders, while at their previous position, had already been working on the
technologies that formed the core of their new firm's knowledge base. Furthermore, 54% had
even been working on similar products.
" The definition of "direct" is that "the company in its present form wuld not have been started without the source-
learned technologies. It now utilizes or utilized at the beginning mostly what the founder(s) learned at the source."
The definition of "partial" is that "an important aspect of the company's work originated with source-learned
technologies. The individual who transferred the technology might have supplemented the source-learned
technologies at other employment between the laboratory and the new enterprise."
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Roberts went further to understand what factors contribute to the technology transfer
from source organization to new firms. His research finds the following four factors
important to the transfer of technology from a source organization to a new enterprise:
* The opportunity to work on development as opposed to pure research projects
* The longer the employment with the source organization, the more direct the
technology transfer from the source organization to the new enterprise was.
* An ability to work part time away from the source organization
* Personal aptitude at about the Master's level of education
Thus, the basic idea surrounding the importance of a source organization is that it is a low-
risk place to learn and get experience before starting a company. While Roberts' work focuses
specifically on the importance of the source organization with respect to the technological base
of new enterprises, the same logic can easily be extended to understand why they form the
managerial basis of new enterprises as well. While working at an MNC might not necessarily
teach someone the best way to operate a business, it gives them experience with what works
and what does not..
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6.3 UNIVERSITIES AS SOURCE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE COMPAIRISON
ECONOMIES
6.3.1 INTRODUCTION
Data shows that universities have played an extremely important role in high-tech industry
formation by providing the technology base of new enterprises. This technology base is not
only provided through the physical transfer of technology, but also through the quality of the
specialized technical training that the university provides. This section looks at how
innovation and training in universities has the potential to affect a software industry. First,
the case of the US is examined in depth, then followed by an examination of the other
comparison economies.
6.3.2 UNIVERSITIES IN THE US
This subsection will look at the role several universities have had on building high-tech
industry in the US.
MIT
As mentioned earlier, research by Ed Roberts showed that, of 125 MIT related companies
surveyed, only 13% had no tie with the technologies that the founders worked on while at
MIT 12 . On the other hand, 53% had very important or important tiesxci. One important
aspect about MIT that led to the tremendous number of companies which share a
technological base with the university's research is the extremely high level of investment in
research at the university.
12 MIT related companies as defined by Roberts as companies which were founded by former employees of MIT
major laboratories and engineering departments.
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Beyond the advanced technology, there were several factors that made MIT important
to the development of many new firms. First, leaders at MIT encouraged faculty, staff, and
students to start their own companies with the technology they had been working on at MIT.
This encouragement started at the top by successive presidents of MIT including Karl Taylor
Compton and James R. Killian. Respected faculty also created important role models for
others. These early faculty-entrepreneurs (and the companies the started) included Doc
Edgerton (EG&G), Bolt and Beranek (BBN), and John Trump (High Voltage Engineering).
Charles Stark Draper, long-time head of MIT's Instrumentation lab was also instrumental in
encouraging numerous people at his lab to start their own companies. In this environment,
there was never any question when somebody wanted "moonlight" on an outside project or
with an outside company. Researchers were even allowed to take home research equipment
during the weekends without any question. According to Roberts, "approximately half of all
spin-off enterprises, including essentially all faculty-initiated companies and many staff
founded firms, are started on a part-time basis, smoothing the way for many entrepreneurs to
'test the waters' of high-tech entrepreneurship before making a full plunge." It is as though
every part of MIT was working in concert to encourage the transfer of technology from MIT
to new firms. Even the Technology Licensing Office (TLO) was making it easier to
commercialize MIT technology. In 1988, the TLO's head, John Preston, initiated new policies
which would allow MIT to license technology in exchange for stock instead of for a fee. In
the first year of the policy, 6 new companies were started based on that practice, and 16 were
started the second year.
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STANFORD
The roots of Silicon Valley can be traced to the efforts of a Stanford faculty member
named Frederick Terman. He encouraged his students, William Hewlett and David Packard,
to start a company based on their PhD researchciii. Like MIT's Compton and Killian, Terman
created an atmosphere that encouraged the commercialization of research and the strong links
between faculty and industry. More recently, the research in Margaret Jacks Hall at Stanford,
former home to the university's computer science department, led to such companies as Cisco
Systems, Sun Microsystem, and Silicon Graphics. Like MIT, the involvement of faculty in
starting companies has been extremely important. Jim Clark, as a professor at Stanford,
developed the technology which became Silicon Graphics. Prof. David Cheriton co-founded a
networking company named Granite which was subsequently sold to Cisco Systems for $220
M. Also, both the former dean of the school of engineering and the chairman of the computer
science department are involved with companies they helped start. As Fortune magazine
describes it, "Stanford is the cause of Silicon Valley. "xc v
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA BERKELEY
The importance of UC Berkeley on the growth of the software industry in Alameda
County California (just outside of Silicon Valley) was confirmed by the research of Anna Lee
Saxinian. According to her, "UC Berkeley professors or graduate students have participated
in virtually every major regional software start-up." She goes on to say that "much more than
capital or any physical resource, knowledge is the most important commodity in software
production. . . .To this end, UC Berkeley and related institutions . . .[are] primarily
responsible for the breadth and character of the regional software industry."xcv
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT SAN DIEGO (UCSD)
Universities and related research institutions were not only important to the development
of the information technology industry in the US, there were also an extremely important
technology source for spawning the biotechnology industry"3 . San Diego was made one of the
leading biotechnology centers in the world mostly because of it's universities and related
research centers. According to one study, 51% of the 90 biotechnology firms that were
established in San Diego between 1971 and 1991 can trace their roots to UCSD and related
research institutes. As with the information technology industry, those researchers employed
by UCSD played a very important role in company formation. Probably one of the most
famous companies started by UCSD researchers was named Hybritech. Hybritech's early
success lead to the formation of a number of other biotechnology companies in the area. In all
about 15% of the companies established between 1971 and 1991 can trace their roots to the
company started by Hybritech.
These different examples of US universities helping to spawn industries or important
segments of industries have three important implications. First, Roberts' research on the
importance of university R&D in forming the technological base of new enterprises seems to
be supported by many other cases outside MIT. Second, it seems to be important for the new
industry to cluster around the university. This is because the geographical proximity allows
ready access to important technologies and people. Finally, in every case described above, an
important form of technology transfer was not by the university licensing its research to an
already established company, but instead was the transfer of that technology through
companies initiated by university faculty or staff.
13 Related research institutions include Scripp's Clinic, the Salk Institute of Biological Studies, and the La Jolla
Cancer Research Foundation.
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6.3.3 UNIVERSITIES IN IRELAND, ISRAEL, AND INDIA
Evidence was gathered on the role of universities in our comparison economies outside of
the US. While evidence was found on university technology being spun-off and having impact
on the local industry, data as detailed as that gathered on the US was difficult to come by.
IRELAND
IONA is arguably the most successful software company coming from Ireland. It's
product is the CORBA standard object request broker which lets different types of computers
better talk with one another. Furthermore, its product is the world leader in that product
category. IONA was founded as a result of experience in distributed systems and object
technology gained by researchers at the department of computer science at Trinity College
Dublinxcv.
Audio Processing Technology (APT) of Belfast is a spin-off company founded from the
R&D work at Queen's University in Ireland. This company created the first digital
soundtrack for a Hollywood motion picture. The movie to first employ APT's technology
was Stephen Spielberg's Jurassic Parkxcvi.
As Roberts discussed, it's not only the physical transfer of a particular technology that is
important, but it is also the training that people get with technologies that is important to
forming the technological base of enterprises. In Ireland, the managing director of
pharmaceutical company mentioned that 50% of the people on his staff were from UCC (a
major research university in Cork, Ireland). Furthermore, the managing director was planning
to raise this number to 60%. What is the reason for this enthusiasm about the graduates of
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UCC? According to the managing director of the pharmaceutical firm, the graduates are
of such high quality because the university is active in research, enabling its graduates to keep
up to speed with developments around the worldxcv.
In general, it seems that the transfer of technology and technical know-how to the private
sector from universities is encouraged in Ireland. In addition to the above examples, another
small, by interesting tell-tale sign of this encouragement is a Web site set up by Ireland's
National Software Directorate. This Web site contains a database of continuously updated
information on current research projects being undertaken by the universities. The database is
searchable via key word searches and by research area, college, deliverables, and sources of
funding4.
ISRAEL
The segment of the Israeli electronics industry which produces components (including
semiconductors) netted $860 million in sales or 14.6 percent of the entire sales of the Israeli
electronics industry. This industry was directly impacted by Israeli universities, namely, the
Technion. The motivation for the Technion to do research in component electronics was a
result of the Yom Kippur war in 1973. During that war, the Israelis were taken by complete
surprise by the night vision capabilities of the Egyptians. However, Israel responded by
developing their own imaging capabilities. This started when the late Professor Yitzhak
Kidron set up a plant at the Technion to design and produce infra-red night vision equipment
for the military. According to Yael Nemirovsky, associate professor of electrical engineering at
the Technion who worked with Kidron until his death, "Professor Kidron was the father of
microelectronics in Israel. . .in the beginning he defined a very specific niche - infrared
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detectors which were required for the defense of Israel. One success brought another and
that is where it all began."'xcix Prof. Kidron's work lead to a plethora of people from the
Technion developing skills in imaging. In the late 1970s, this specialization in imaging led to
the first two civilian companies which soon became world leaders in their market. These were
Scitex in digitized pre-press systems and Elscint in computerized tomography. They were also
very noteworthy in that they helped set some of the earliest examples for others to follow 5of
Israeli high-tech companies going public in the US'.
INDIA
The role of Indian universities has been to impart software development know-how into
its graduates. As described in detail in the chapter on human resources, Indian educated
engineers are described as extremely capable and their skill is an important reason for the
growth of the indigenous industry. However, detailed data about the connection between the
technical education in universities and the technical expertise of Indian software engineers was
difficult to find, and presents an area where more research needs to be done.
6.3.4 CONCLUSION
Strong evidence from three of our four comparison economies show that universities play
an important role in providing the technological base for new enterprises in the high-tech
industry. Furthermore, in these economies, it has been the new enterprises, as opposed to
more established ones, which have played an important part in the growth of the industry.
The two key attributes of universities as source organizations seem to be their extensive
14 The Web site can be found at http://www.nsd.ie/cgi-bin/ResearchQuery
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investment in R&D and the opportunities they create for transferring technology and
technical know-how into the commercial sector. As was seen in the case of the US, a
particularly important method of technology transfer was when university faculty or staff
took the their technology or technical expertise and created a new company. The ease with
which this method of technology transfer could occur seems to be facilitated by the culture of
the various universities.
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6.4 UNIVERSITIES AS SOURCE ORGANIZATIONS IN HONG KONG
6.4.1 INRODUCTION
In the sections above, we identified two main factors that have allowed universities to have
an important impact on the respective indigenous high-tech industries in three of our four
comparison economies. First, research done at the universities created a source of technology
or technical know-how that was important to the formation of firms and even industries.
Second, transfer of the technology by faculty, students, and staff was facilitated in various ways
by the university. Using this two-factor framework, we can examine the extent of the impact
Hong Kong universities are having and potentially can have on the indigenous high-tech
industry.
6.4.2 INNOVATION IN HONG KONG UNIVERSITIES
Research shows that innovation in Hong Kong's university system is fettered. In the two
years including 1995 and 1996, data from 4 of Hong Kong's 5 research universities shows that
there were only 9 patents received across all disciplines. This is despite the more the almost
$100 million that was invested in technological researchc'. Interviews with those in the Hong
Kong university system suggest there might be several reasons for this.
One issue stems from the lack of space to do research. Several universities mentioned that
it was lack of space, not money, that prevented them from doing more research. According to
person 6 of CU, "Funding is not a problem to get a program going, the greatest problem is
lack of lab space. . .computer science is the worst off, or as some like to say, the most
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efficient." Person 4, a senior faculty in the computer science department at Hong Kong
U, said that "before we moved last September, we were very tight on space. University policy
is that graduate students don't get offices, so this impacted the amount of lab space we had."
Speaking more generally about the situation of universities in Hong Kong, the president of
one of Hong Kong's leading universities said that "universities really need some low grade
space where we can do some activities." He went on to speak of his university's situation in
particular saying that "our professors are hard-pressed for space to do their research." Inspired
by the technology transfer created by MIT's Lincoln Labs, the dean of the engineering
department of one major Hong Kong university wanted to create a similar lab at his
university. However, as with the situation mentioned by the other universities above, he said
the major barrier to creating such a lab is that there is no space. The only university that we
asked about the space issue where it didn't seem to be a problem was at HKUST. However, at
the time of the interview, that university was only about 5 years old.
The second major issue that seems to be effecting the quality level of research being done
has to do with people. Specifically, the issue raised by many is that Hong Kong research
assistants (RAs) and graduate students are not interested in research and consequently do not
do good research'5 . Person 2, a computer science professor at PolyU, describes PolyU's
situation:
15 In Hong Kong, RAs are individuals who have already received their undergraduate degree and who are currently
doing research at a university. However, RAs are not in a degree program
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"Most of the good Hong Kong undergraduates go to graduate school abroad. As
for research assistants (RAs), most stay 9-10 months and then leave, especially in
computing. This is because it's easier to find a job once they work here for a little
while. We have 10 RAs, but their quality is not that good. Most of the people from
Hong Kong that apply to be RAs are the ones who couldn't get a job after their
undergraduate degree. That is why most faculty here like to get their RAs from
China. We have 25 grad students. The problem is that we can't use the money
allocated for RAs to attract good grad students. Another problem is that the
government limits the number of non-local grad students to about 25%. However,
we're fighting to increase this number to 40%."
The difficulties that result from not being able to attract good researchers is told best by
the numbers. During the two years including 1995 and 1996, PolyU did not produce any
patents in any fields of researchi.
Person 4, a professor at Hong KongU's computer science department, describes a similar
situation:
The same story is told yet again by person H, a former lecturer in computer science at
Chinese University: According to person H:
"About 10% of grad students [in his department] were the better undergrads when
they were in college. However, we have to bring in a lot of people from China. We
rely heavily on RA's from China to get our research done. In terms of graduate
students, there is a limit to the number that we can have from China. The grad
students from China are usually of better quality than the Hong Kong ones. The
students from China also work much harder than the Hong Kong ones. A student
who comes from China to be an RA or regular grad student makes Hong
Kong$15,000 per month. A professor in China makes Hong Kong$1,000 per
month. So they come here and try to save as much as they can. Besides just being
hardworking by nature, when you don't want to spend your money on recreation
you don't have too many other things to do besides work.
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Grad students don't go to grad school to do research, they go there to job hunt
Between the lack of research space and the lack of quality student researchers, universities
face major challenges to becoming sources of innovation for the local high-tech industry.
Finally, a third issue brought up by several is that it may just be an issue of time. That is
to say, many believe that real research in Hong Kong universities only started in the early
1990s. Person 6, a computer science faculty member at Chinese University, mentioned that
"about 3 years ago, we were asked to emphasize research even more." The dean of one of the
engineering departments at a major Hong Kong university further concurred that "local
university research just developed in the last 5-6 years." According to person 2 of PolyU's
computing department, PolyU's older faculty in his department were all trained in the data
processing centers of large companies, not in academia. However, it is important to keep in
mind that, while it might just be a matter of time before Hong Kong universities start
generating more innovation, current problems such as space constraints and lack of research
oriented graduate students and RAs points to the fact that more has to be done than just
waiting.
----- - ---- -
and get a good salary while they are hunting. This is not my personal opinion, it is
a fact. Many grad students neverfinish their degree because they get a job offerfirst.
For example, I knew a student in computer science getting his Ph.D. He was very
good, but he quit a year before he got his degree to go to Hong Kong Bank's IT
division to do source code control"6. Because of this problem, professors don't require
a lot of work out of their grad students. Grad students get good pay for doing
mediocre work because most funding is restricted to personnel usage. Professors
don't dismiss these grad students because the norm is that grad students don't do
work. Also, if they dismiss grad students, that means they get less money for their
research because they have a smaller head-count in their lab. The result is that not
too many good papers get published. The people that do publish are usually outsiders
who brought their work to Hong Kong.
----~~~~_~
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6.4.3 ABILITY TO TRANSFER INNOVATIONS FROM THE UNIVERSITIES TO INDUSTRY
An important factor in allowing technologies developed at universities to have impact on
an industry is the ease with which those technologies can be transferred. As we saw from our
comparison economies, one important way that this manifests itself is through the degree to
which universities encourage their faculty and staff to interact with industry and even the
degree to which they encourage their faculty to leave academia and form new companies.
While I do not have in-depth data for Hong Kong, various pieces of anecdotal data suggests
that there are a variety of barriers that impeded the transfer of technology in this way from
Hong Kong universities. Probably first among the various issues is the cost to a faculty
member if he or she wants to leave the university. Since universities provide subsidized
housing for many of their faculty, leaving the university would not only mean the
disappearance of one's salary, but also the corresponding difficulty in finding an affordable
place to live that meets the faculty member's standards. Interviews suggested that challenges
associated with housing discouraged faculty from taking their technology or technical know-
how and leaving to start a new company. A second issue seemed to be the limited interaction
the faculty had with the local software industry. Interviews with the computer science
department of one of Hong Kong's top three universities uncovered the fact that only one
faculty member in the entire computer science department consults with industry. A third
issue is the availability of space to setup a new company once one gets an idea. Unlike
Stanford's Industrial Park, and the area around MIT, faculty who want to leave the university
will find it difficult to find low cost office space. A final issue that was raised by interviewees
16 Source code control basically involves ensuring that, when different people are working on the same piece of
software, that the newest version doesn't get overwritten by something older. In general it involves little
innovation or R&D.
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was that some universities don't have efficient technology transfer programs. A CEO of
one of Hong Kong's largest software companies mentioned that he wanted to license a
technology from a university to put into a new product. However, because the technology
was created with government money, the CEO would have to repay the full cost of
developing that technology before he could develop a product around it.
It is clear that more in-depth data is needed on the ease with which technology can be
transferred from Hong Kong universities. However, there does seem to be effort in the area of
facilitating technology transfer via generating more awareness about Hong Kong technology.
For example, the Hong Kong Industrial Technology Center Corporation publishes the
Business and Technology Information Quarterly and they also have various seminars which
also try to promote technology in Hong Kong to the private sector. Hong Kong's newest
university, Hong KongUST, has also been active in promoting technology transfer to
corporations via its RandD corporation. However, as we saw with many examples from our
comparison economies, technology transfer by university faculty and staff going off to start
their own companies has been an extremely important method of technology transfer to the
private sector. When identifying opportunities for technology transfer, Hong Kong
universities cannot forget to take this method into account.
6.4.4 CONCLUSION
Evidence from our comparison economies suggests that universities play an extremely
important role in contributing to the growth of various high-tech industries. They play this
important role because they allow people to work on innovative technologies and because
they a way for actual technology or the technical know-how to be transferred to the industry.
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However, evidence from our comparison economies show that an important method of
transfer was not simply the sale or licensing of the university's technology to an outside
corporation, but instead an important method of transfer was that people from the universities
actually left to form new companies with their technologies. Given this, the challenges for
Hong Kong universities seem to be two fold. First, due to space and human resource
constraints, Hong Kong universities do not seem to be the same sources of innovation that
their foreign counterparts are. Second, due to a variety of factors, the transfer of the
technology from Hong Kong universities to the private sector seems to be constrained. The
result is that the indigenous industry is missing an important variable for growth.
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6.5 CORPORATIONS AS SOURCE ORGANIZATIONS IN COMPAIRSON
ECONOMIES
6.5.1 INTRODUCTION
Large corporations were also identified by Roberts as important sources for forming the
technological base of new high-tech enterprises. However, while Roberts solely focuses on the
importance of technology transfer from corporations to new enterprises, my definition also
incorporates the transfer of managerial know-how. Managerial know-how is a catch-all for the
experience one gets by working in large high-tech firm that goes beyond the technology. This
is important because spending time in a corporate environment gives potential entrepreneurs a
perspective on how a high-tech organization is run. The following sub-sections describes the
impact of corporate source organizations for each of our comparison economies.
6.5.2 THE US
Evidence showing that large high-tech organizations in the US provide important
managerial and technical know-how to new firms is numerous. Unlike Route 128, Ed Roberts
finds that Silicon Valley and "the resulting proliferation of firms there came from multiple
spin-offs of other companies, and did not follow the dominant greater Boston pattern of direct
fostering of new firms from university labs and departments. "xc"' For example, Fairchild
Semiconductor gave birth to such industry giants which include Intel, National
Semiconductor, and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD)cii". Xerox PARC was the source of the
ethernet technology that started 3Com as well as technologies that were the base of a number
of other companies.. Tracor, an electronic warfare equipment manufacturer in Austin Texas is
responsible for creating 16 new firms in the Austin area. Similar to universities, these large
companies provide people with a low-risk opportunity to learn about various technologies and
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the problems which those technologies can solve. However, they also provide and added
dimension of learning where potential entrepreneurs get exposed to dealing with high-tech
products in the market.
6.5.3 IRELAND
In Ireland, engineers' training both abroad and domestically in (mainly US) MNCs was
cited as an important factor in helping the indigenous software industry to growc"". Heavy
investment in educating engineers by the Irish government created a surplus of labor who
mostly went to the US to find work. Data shows that between 10 and 20% of Irish computer
science graduates emigrate within one year of graduation. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
50% to 70% emigrate at some point in their career thereby creating a significant brain drain '".
However, the experience they gain working in MNCs (whether abroad or domestically) gives
them the experience to start their own firms and the credentials to obtain VC funding. For
example, RFT is Irish firm which makes software for the manufacturing industry. As
described in the chapter on capital markets, the Irish venture capital firm ICC invested in RFT
when it was three years old. This was one of the youngest companies that ICC had invested in
and they only did so because RFT's products were "highly innovative and because their
directors were all very experienced in the industry." Where did the directors of RFT get this
experience? According to one of the founders of RFT, "All of us were senior managers with
US manufacturing organizations in Ireland before we set up our own business." civ
6.5.4 INDIA
The growth of the software industry in India also seems to be strongly affected by the
contributions of Indians who were trained in US high-tech MNCs. Specifically, researchers
sight the contributions of expatriate Indians as one of three key factors leading to the success
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and growth of the Indian software industrycv. According to this research, "Indian
engineers and technicians who migrated to the west, mostly to the US, during the sixties and
the seventies appear to be a source of finance, technical assistance, and market intelligence to
the Indian companies."" Some very successful Indian software companies like Wipro Limited,
Infomart, and BPL systems were started by return migrants. One of the unique aspects of the
Indian software industry compared with other industry's in India is the management system
used by most indigenous software firms. The management style in many software firms is said
to be an important part of what makes the industry competitive in export markets. According
to researchers:
6.5.5 ISRAEL
High-tech in Israel was affected by a similar "brain drain and return" phenomena that both
India and Ireland experienced. According to one business article:
"the communication channels between the top management and the young software
engineers appears to be free of the hierarchy and bureaucracy typical of the
traditional industries. The managers are acutely conscious of the needfor training
and the promotion of job satisfaction for their employees. . .it is the training and
life styles which the managers have acquired abroad. . .[which] explains [this]
enlightened style of management. '"
"Throughout the state's half century, Israeli universities trained engineers in the
latest technologies for the country's defense. But, with no internal commercial
market, until a decade ago, the supply of graduates far exceeded the demand. Many
left, mostlyfor the United States, in search of greener pastures and higher education.
Dov Frohman developed the original EPROM at Intel. Yaron Shamir, general
manager of Microsoft's R&D lab in Israel, was Microsoft's development manager
for networking and OS. Joseph Raviv managed groups at IBM's Thomas J. Watson
Research Center. They sold their American bosses on the potential of Israel's
plentiful technical brain power, and returned to head the investment. Most such
ventures succeeded and grew."'
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The experience working in MNCs that the individuals mentioned in the quote above
got gave them the opportunity to return to Israel to start the Israeli subsidiary of their
respective parent MNCs. Essentially, they came back and started new companies which have
been important contributors to the Israeli high-tech industry. While much of the attention in
Israeli high-tech goes to the indigenous industry, figures from 1994 show that subsidiaries of
foreign MNCs play no small role. The Intel subsidiary that Dov Forhman started had 451
people and was designing next generation processors for Intel. The Microsoft's R&D center
started by Yaron Shamir had 26 people and was responsible for designing MS Proxy Server-
Microsoft's network firewall software. Finally, Joseph Raviv's IBM subsidiary had 240 people
working on a variety of technologies vi .
6.5.6 CONCLUSION
The type of corporations that seem to make the most effective source organizations are
those which invest heavily in R&D and which in turn have internationally competitive high-
tech products. However, the data from our various comparison economies shows that
corporate source organizations are not only important for the technical know-how they
impart in people, but also for the managerial know-how. In essence, the provide a "complete"
training experience for those who might one day want to start their own firm. Finally, we
find that corporate source organizations do not necessarily have to be domestically located for
them to have an impact on the domestic high-tech industry. Since high-technology is very
knowledge intensive, the value of the experience one gets from working at an MNC can easily
be brought to whatever location a person chooses to call home. These lessons learned from
our comparison economies will all have important implications for understanding the role of
corporate source organizations in Hong Kong in the next section.
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6.6 COMPANIES AS SOURCE ORGANIZATIONS IN HONG KONG
Hong Kong is not without examples of corporate source organizations helping to spawn
new companies. Motorla, Hong Kong's best example of a large high-tech MNC doing R&D
in the territory, led to the formation of a company called Group Sense Limited (GSL). GSL
develops hand-held electronic dictionaries for the Asian market, and, in 1995, was a public
company on the Hong KongSE with revenue of approximately US$53 M. One of the
founders of GSL, Samson Tam, had worked at Motorola in Hong Kong before starting the
company. Mr. Tam started GSL because he knew early on about a chip that Motorola Hong
Kong was developing that would improve the performance of various types of personal digital
assistants like hand-held electronic dictionaries. An important part of GSL's success comes
from building one of the first products that took advantage of Motorola's new technology.
However, stories such as this are few and bar between in Hong Kong. According to Mr. C.D.
Tam, the General Manager of Motorola's Asia Pacific Group, "the weakest link in Hong Kong
is the entrepreneur's link to the big developers like Motorola. . .there needs to be more
opportunities for people like Samson Tam of GSL." Corporate source organizations in Hong
Kong which provide exposure and training to the latest information technology R&D are
scarce. It is not only that there are very few large high-tech corporations doing R&D in Hong
Kong, there are simply very few large high-tech corporations in Hong Kong period. Appendix
A shows that there are only 18 companies on the Hong Kong stock exchange that might be
considered high-tech. This lack of corporate source organizations, in terms of sheer numbers,
simply creates a dearth of people who have the necessary training and experience to start their
own high-tech companies..
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One main issue seems to be that companies in Hong Kong, MNC or otherwise, for
the most part don't do R&D. As the case of GSL and the evidence in the previous section
showed, technologies coming from source corporations play a very important part in forming
the technological base of new high-tech enterprises. The table below compares the amount 
of
R&D done in Hong Kong with the amount of R&D being done in the comparison economies
(all as a percentage of GDP).
USA
Israel
Ireland
India
Hong Kong
2.28%
2.11%
1.31%
.69%
.26%
Table 10: R&D as a % of GDP i"'
As table 1 above shows, there is significantly less R&D being done in Hong Kong 
than in
any of the comparison economies. In fact, using the April 1998 rankings of the 
World
Competitiveness Report published by IMD, Hong Kong ranks as number 40 out of 
45
countries in terms of total R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP (with the country
ranked #45 spending the lowest on R&D as a percentage of GDP)cviii. Also, according to the
data, nine 3rd world countries (out of the eleven 3 'r world countries in the group of 45) actually
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spend more on R&D as percentage of GDP than Hong Kong'7 . (Appendix B provides a
detailed ranking of R&D expenditures for each of the 45 countries).
Despite this low level of R&D in Hong Kong, many take comfort in the vision that Hong
Kong will provide the business know-how while China provides the technical know-how.
However, China is not much better off than Hong Kong. It only spends .43% of GDP on
R&D. This is still well below our four other comparison economies, and this level of
spending places China as number 35 out of the 45 countries compared. However, even this
level of .43% is misleading. The reason why is best explained by Dr. Raymond Ch'ien,
chairman of the Hong KongITDC. According to Dr. Ch'ien, "China has a lot of talented
people trying to reinvent the wheel-the problem is that it doesn't always turn out round. The
problem stems from the fact that the Chinese are reluctant to let their best and brightest
become familiar with foreign cultures."''cx Research has shown that, at the end of 1995, only
5% of Chinese R&D could be characterized as advanced technology and that only 20% of their
advanced technology was on par with international industrial technology standards. Thus,
only 1% of all Chinese R&D was considered to be internationally competitive"cx. Whether it is
in Hong Kong or China, sources of advanced technology that can be transferred to new firms
are scarce.
Complementary to the missing component of innovation in Hong Kong companies, there
is also the missing component of training opportunities. Since companies in Hong Kong do
not work on researching and developing innovative technologies, there are few places
domestically where Hong Kong engineers can get experience developing, and managing the
development of an advanced technology product-skills critical to initiating a high-tech start-
17 3 rd world countries are classified as those countries identified by the World Bank publication, "Trends in
Developing Economies" (1994), as Less Developed Countries (LDC's).
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up. Dr. Olin Shivers, a lecturer at Hong KongU and now a lecturer at MIT describes the
impact this is having:
This lack of an outlet for those who want to do research causes faculty members to
discourage top students from pursuing graduate work. Prof. Irwin King of Chinese U says "I
don't encourage students to get PhD's because all the top jobs are taken by outsiders. Also,
most companies don't have research centers here so there is not outlet for PhDs in terms of
careers for people who want to stay in Hong Kong." The fact that there are very few source
organizations where people can get the training that will prepare them to launch a technology
oriented company affects Hong Kong in a variety of ways. One way is that the territory's best
engineers are not being taught design work, but instead they are being taught how to be
system administrators. According to person 9, a senior faculty member in the electrical
engineering department of HKUST, "the difficulty is that there is not a job market for design
engineers. The demand is for system administrators and IT administrators, both of which pay
more than design engineers." This has led Hong KongUST, Hong Kong's premier technical
university, to implement a mandatory training program for it's IT engineers which involves
them spending several weeks studying how to become a UNIX system administrator. The
lack of work experience opportunities which provide development experience can be directly
seen from the statistics. In Hong Kong, there are less than 10 R&D personnel for every 10,000
"Some of my most talented students went to MIS [management of information
systems] jobs in banks. The result is that a lot of talent gets wasted. Hong Kong
doesn't put its top students into jobs where they can really strengthen the software
development industry. Also, once you graduate with a PhD, there won't be job
opportunities that meet you educational level. Companies here don't understand
the value ofa Ph.D."
1~- 11~----- ~- ~ -- 
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people in the workforce. This is as compared to 40 in Singapore, 75 in the US, and 80 in
Japan x.
In the end, the fact that source organizations are not providing the technology or the
training means that individuals in Hong Kong have very little base with which to start new
high-tech companies. In a recent interview, Mr. Loo Hock Voon, Vice President of Walden
International Investment Group, a major VC firm focusing on Asian high-tech companies,
describes the importance of corporate source organization. Mr. Voon commented that
employees of MNCs who wish to set up their own businesses are attractive potential
investment prospects since they generally have the necessary knowledge, contacts, and
management skills to establish themselves and prosper in their chosen field. When talking in
general about the types of people he backs who are starting companies in Asia, Mr. Voon
comments that "the returnees we back are invariably between 35 and 45 years old because they
are still hungry for success and are prepared to work for it. They have also gained 10 to 15
years experience of working overseas." However, he adds that in Hong Kong, "there are not
enough of these people."cxi Dr. Christopher Leong, president of Transpac Capital, another VC
firm focusing on high-tech in Asia, iterated similar feelings. According to Mr. Leong, "Taiwan
built their technology on returning engineers from the US, but in Hong Kong, the students go
abroad to study business."cix
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6.7 CONCLUSION
This chapter identified two main types of source organizations and the types of impact
they have on driving a high-tech industry. While the relative weight of the importance of the
two types of source organizations may vary from economy to economy, when taken in
aggregate, they seemed to play an important role in the development of the high-tech industry
in each one of our comparison economies. The fact that, in aggregate, source organizations
seemed to play an important role in each of the comparison economies, despite the very
different reasons for the success of the software industries in each of the economies, seems to
distinguish this variable in importance from those covered in most of the other chapters in this
thesis.
One significant form of impact that both universities and companies have in contributing
to the growth of a high-tech industry is that their R&D plays an important part in forming the
technological base of new enterprises. This was found to be the case not only in the US but
internationally as well. Research on Hong Kong showed that there were extremely low levels
of innovation and R&D at both universities and in the private sector. In the case of
universities, there is a complementary issue of the ease with which technology transfer can be
done. While there are various ways with which technology can be transferred, one of the
most dominant patters in the US has been where a faculty or staff member takes a leave of
absence from the university to start the new company. Due to housing issues, among others,
the ease with which this type of technology transfer can happen in Hong Kong is of serious
doubt.
A second important contribution of source organizations is the training they provide.
They provide a low risk place where people can learn how to develop an advanced technology
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product, and manage that product in the market. These are both skills that are very
important to new companies. Evidence suggests that the high-tech industry in India, Ireland,
Israel, and Taiwan all benefited from people who got training in high-tech MNCs for a
number of years before starting their own company in their homeland. Maybe more
importantly, venture capitalists feel more comfortable backing people who have significant
work experience at MNCs.
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APPENDIX A
The following describes the only "high-tech" companies listed on the Hong KongSE
Asia Satellite
ASM Pacific
Capetronic
Elec &Eltek International
Founder
Gold Peak
Goldtron
IDT
Johnson Electric
Legend
QPL
1,255.849
2,189.412
1,052.080
2,257.097 (mar '94)
2.392
631.730 (mar '94)
1,506.806 (mar '94)
2,427.057 (mar '94)
1,682.172 (apr '94)
Makes and markets machines, tools and
materials used in the mfg of
semiconductors.
design, development, and mfg of
computer monitors and TVs.
Makes and sells PCBs, fax machines, and
liquid crystal displays. PCB mfg
facilities in Hong Kong, PRC and
Thailand. Listed PCB business on
S'pore stock exchange and opened
business there. Started by Professor Loh
Shiu-chang of the Chinese University of
Hon Kong
Probably the largest software company
indigenous to China.
Mfg and marketing operations in 15
countries. Makes batteries, audio
equipment, and other electronics. Does
OEM and own brand name. Exclusive
distributor for Onkyo and NAD hi-fi in
PRC, Hong Kong, and Macau.
Mfg, markets, and assembles blank
video tapes.
Make LCD consumer electronics,
cordless phones, and LCD video
doorphones. Subsidiaries produce
electronic translators too. Does both
OEM and private-label. Sales offices in
US and Europe.
Design, mfg, and mktg of micromotors.
Sales to US, Europe and Asia.
Development centers in US, Asia, and
Europe.
Does OEM comp mfg for HP, IBM,
Appel, and has own brand in PRC. Sales
subsidiaries in US and Europe.
Mfg oflC leadframes, and assembly of
Ics, and silicon-wafer fabrication.
Factories in Asia, US, and Europe.
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Star Paging
Stone Electronic
Tricom
Ultronics
V-Tech
Vanda
Varitronix
670.996
1,462.185
382.943
162.385
317.092 (mar '94)
601.215
In telecom and Internet access. Busienss
in Asia and India.
One of the largest none-state owned hgh-
tech companies in the PRC. Mfg and sale
of integrated word processords.
Distribution rights for OKI printers in
US.
Marketing, sale, and tech support of
telecom products. Products are typically
mfg by US or Japanese companies, but
trying to develop their own name
products.
Mktg and distribution of technologically
advanced medical products in PRC,
Hong Kong, and Macau. Also mkts and
distributes scientific equipment.
Designer and manufacturer of various
electronic and communication devices.
Most recently 900MHz phones.
The group is principally a systems
integrator for computer systems projects
as well as a distributor of PCs and
peripherals in the PRC. Head office in
Hong Kong, offices in PRC, wholly
owned subsidiary in Singapore.
Design, mfg, and sale of LCD products
for customized industrial applications
and for the consume market. Network
of distributors in over 30 countries.
Sales offices in US and Europe.
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APPENDIX B
The data in the table below comes from the April 1998 World Competitiveness Report
rankings published by IMD. The table below shows GDP, total R&D expenditures, and R&D
as a percentage of GDP for 45 countries. There is also a column that shows whether the
country is a Less Developed Country (LCD), also known as a 3r world country. The table is
sorted in descending order by R&D as a percentage of GDP.
The following variables are used in the table below:
GDP: Gross Domestic Product in US dollars
R&D: Total R&D Expenditures in US dollars
%GDP: R&D Expenditures as a percentage of GDP
LDC: Indicating whether or not the country is considered as "less developed" by the
World Bank.
Country
Sweden
Japan
Korea
France
Switzerland
Germany
Finland
Netherlands
USA
Israel
Denmark
Belgium
Taiwan
UK
Austria
Norway
Canada
Iceland
GDP
2.26E+12
4.19E+13
4.42E+12
1.38E+13
2.51E+12
2.08E+13
1.15E+12
3.54E+12
8.083E+13
9.80E+11
1.57E+12
2.41 E+12
2.83E+12
1.29E+13
2.04E+12
1.50E+12
6.18E+12
7.40E+10
R&D
8.30E+10
1.53E+12
1.35E+11
3.56E+11
6.47E+10
5.36E+11
2.96E+10
8.25E+10
1.85E+12
2.07E+10
3.31 E+10
4.33E+10
5.05E+10
2.26E+11
3.44E+10
2.51 E+10
9.61 E+10
1.10E+09
%GDP
3.673893805
3.659364548
3.059276018
2.580942029
2.575697211
2.573320537
2.572173913
2.33079096
2.284609675
2.112244898
2.108280255
1.797925311
1.783745583
1.75321955
1.687254902
1.674
1.554368932
1.486486486
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
LDC
1
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Indonesia 2.27E+12
Australia
Singapore
Ireland
Italy
Czech Rep.
Spain
New Zealand
Russia
S. Africa
Hungary
India
Chile
Poland
Portugal
Brazil
China
Greece
Argentina
Turkey
Venezuela
Hong Kong
Malaysia
Mexico
Columbia
Philippines
Thailand
3.94E+12
9.60E+11
6.90E+11
1.13E+13
5.08E+11
5.22E+12
6.40E+11
4.61E+12
1.26E+12
4.50E+11
3.16E+12
7.10 E+11
1.35E+12
1.00E+12
7.49E+12
9.02E+12
1.19E+12
2.97E+12
1.90E+12
8.75E+11
1.54E+12
9.90E+11
4.02E+12
9.50E+11
8.30E+11
1.84E+12
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5.43E+10
1.27E+10
9.04E+09
1.36E+11
5.99E+09
4.87E+10
5.84E+09
3.76E+10
9.42E+09
3.28E+09
2.19E+10
4.85E+09
8.80E+09
6.08E+09
4.07E+10
3.93E+10
4.38E+09
1.03E+10
6.44E+09
2.87E+09
4.03E+09
2.26E+09
8.86E+09
2.06E+09
1.15E+09
2.08E+09
1.87E+0945
1.379187817
1.323958333
1.310144928
1.200441306
1.179133858
0.932375479
0.9125
0.815618221
0.747619048
0.728888889
0.692405063
0.683098592
0.651851852
0.608
0.543391188
0.436031042
0.368067227
0.346801347
0.338947368
0.328
0.261688312
0.228282828
0.22039801
0.216842105
0.138554217
0.113043478
0.082378855
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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7. CONCLUSION
This research looked at the role of five key variables in affecting the development of Hong
Kong's software industry. These five variables, intellectual property protection, domestic
market size, capital markets, human resources, and source organizations, were all factors that
seemed to be impacting the development of Hong Kong's software industry as indicated
during the original research done as part of the MBHK project. However, what the MBHK
research did not provide was a context with which we could evaluate the importance of these
variables relative to each other.
This thesis built on the MBHK research by providing such a context. The context was
developed by looking at the role of these key variables not just in the Hong Kong software
industry, but also in the software industries of four comparison economies-the US, Ireland,
India, and Israel. The comparison economies were chosen because they all have what many
consider to be successful software industries, and because the route to success for each of the
software industries in the comparison economies was very different. Independent of the path
to success, this allowed us to understand which variables are more fundamental than others in
contributing to a software industry's growth.
Without re-stating the conclusions of each of the previous chapters, we found that only
two variables of the five played important roles in the development of the software industries
in all of our comparison economies. The first of these was human resources. Having well-
trained and well-educated engineers going into the software industry was a feature common to
each of the comparison economies. Furthermore, if we look at each of the five variables as an
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area for "investment" by the government (where "investment" is defined as any activity by
the government which would promote the positive impact of that variable on the software
industry), then in each of the comparison economies the original investment in the software
industry was made in human resources. The second variable that was important to each of the
comparison economies was the one defined as source organizations. Source organizations were
important because they provided a low-risk environment where potential entrepreneurs could
develop both technological and managerial know-how. Like human resources, strong source
organizations seemed to play a key role in each of the comparison economies from the very
beginning of their respective high-tech industry's formation.
When the industry reaches a certain critical mass, capital markets then become important
in fueling the further growth of the industry. This was seen clearly in the case of the US,
Israel, and India and also seems to be true of Ireland (but more data is needed to confirm this).
The two remaining variables, domestic market size and intellectual property protection,
are certainly helpful to a software industry, but evidence suggests that they are not critical to
an industry's growth. Ireland, Israel, and India have rapidly growing software industries yet
they also have relatively small domestic markets and very poor domestic intellectual property
protection. The reasons for the lower importance of these two variables seems to be because,
when an industry has strong human resources and source organizations, they are able to be
competitive in export markets. Thus, the importance of the domestic market is diminished.
Taken in aggregate, the data on how each of the five variables affects a software industry
suggests a model for the way high-tech industries develop. The first step is the education and
training of people. This primarily begins with the domestic university system. India, Ireland,
Israel, and the US all had made important investments in the university systems long preceded
164
the significant growth of their respective high technology industries. The investments had
an important impact on the quality of the labor force. A factor which those in each of the
comparison economies sight as being a key reason for the success of the high-tech sectors in
the respective economies. Once there were well educated engineers being produced, those
engineers need a place to go to continue to learn and challenge themselves. Whether
domestically or abroad, these engineers went to source organizations which allowed them to
work on leading edge technology and business problems. In the case of Ireland, Israel, and
India, we saw a similar pattern of a "brain drain" followed by a flux of return migrants whose
experience at MNCs abroad helped play an important role in the formation of their respective
domestic technology sectors. In the US, we had data which showed the importance that a new
enterprise's founder placed on his or her experience with the previous employer. We also saw
an important role for universities as source organizations in the case or the US, Ireland, and
Israel. In these economies, technology being developed at the universities played an important
role in forming important indigenous high-tech companies and even industries. Once there
was a critical mass of well educated people with experience in source organizations, the next
issue became the flow of people from source organizations to start-ups. Reasons for this flow
seemed to point to a variety of factors that ranged from the tangible (such as layoffs in the case
when the Israeli military cut back jobs), to the intangible (such as the culture created at
universities like Stanford and MIT). Once there is a critical mass of well educated and trained
people who are interested starting and growing companies, then venture capital becomes
important to the long term growth of the industry. Venture capital provides the needed
resources for companies at different stages in the their growth to expand faster than simple
organic growth might allow them to. Evidence from the US, Israel, India, and Hong Kong
showed how venture capital had impact only after there was a critical mass of well trained
people, source organizations, and a compelling reason for people to leave the source
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organizations to start new companies. Finally, characteristics of the domestic market such
as its size, sophistication, or level of intellectual property protection certainly affect the
domestic industry, but they don't seem to be critical to the industry's success or failure.
The research on Hong Kong and the various comparison economies has important
implications for where industrialists and policy makers in Hong Kong should place their
efforts. While many in Hong Kong are spending a lot of time trying to address the issues of
capital availability, domestic market size, and intellectual property protection, the results of
this thesis suggest that other variables are in need of greater attention. Specifically, the
problems associated with human resources and with the scarcity of source organizations seems
to be the most fundamental barriers to the growth of Hong Kong's domestic software
industry. These findings have added urgency given that the impact of investments in
overcoming these two barriers will not become evident for some time.
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